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Abstract
The Air Force Working Capital Fund (AFWCF), a revolving fund established to
create a more business-like environment between the Air Force and its customers, is
comprised of several divisions providing depot level repairs, supplies and inventory,
information technology solutions and transportation services to military customers. Since
its establishment, the AFWCF has been the source of much criticism due to its inability to
meet its primary goal of operating on a break-even basis. Ideally, the Fund will generate
enough revenue from the sale of goods or services to cover its expenses and break-even.
Instead, there is either a surplus that must be reintroduced into the AFWCF or, as most
often the case, a deficit occurs. Due to regulatory requirements, the Fund must recoup
these lost monies in a subsequent year. This profoundly affects the ability to accurately
build the budget and reach the break-even point. This research analyzes the past
performance of the AFWCF and identifies which areas are key drivers in preventing the
AFWCF from meeting this goal. Lastly, the pricing strategy of the Materiel Support
Division was evaluated based on commercial best practices to determine if its pricing
schema lends itself to meeting the goals of the AFWCF.

ix

AN ANALYSIS OF THE PRICING STRATEGY EMPLOYED BY AN AIR
FORCE WORKING CAPITAL FUND ORGANIZATION
I. Introduction
Background
Since its inception, the Department of Defense (DOD) has struggled to keep costs
under control and within budget constraints. Throughout its existence, many attempts
have been made to alter the DOD’s operating environment. Most recently, Acquisition
Reform and Earned Value Management have impacted Defense communities with
positive results. However, these most recent reform initiatives have failed to largely
influence one area of the DOD in particular, the Defense Working Capital Fund (DWCF).
The DWCF is the direct result of the dissolution of the Defense Business
Operations Fund (DBOF). DBOF, a revolving fund account that sells unique goods and
services, was established in 1991 by combining the nine industrial and stock funds that
had been established as early as the mid-1800s. The goals of DBOF were to fully recover
costs (break-even over time), reduce inventory levels and support costs, consolidate
similar operations, and provide visibility of total costs (FMRS, Chapter 80-6). Prior to
the realignment of these funds, each account was separately managed. Subsequent to the
stand-up of DBOF, the funds were centrally managed by the Office of the Secretary of
Defense (Comptroller). Later, the “DOD devolved the responsibility for cash
management to the military services and DOD Components” (GAO, 1997: 2) and created
the Defense Working Capital Fund. The premise behind this change was to create a more
business-like environment and instill stronger buyer-seller relationships between its
customers and Fund divisions. Soon after the change to the DWCF, the Under Secretary
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of Defense (Comptroller) formed the four initial working capital funds as we know them
today: Army, Navy, Air Force and Defense-wide (the Defense Commissary Agency was
added in 1999). This further dissemination of responsibility provided a means of
allowing each of the services management control of all financial and functional facets of
their Funds.

Defense Working Capital Fund
Army Working Capital Fund

Air Force Working Capital Fund

Navy Working Capital Fund

Defense-Wide Working Capital Fund

Figure 1. DWCF Organization
While all of DBOF’s goals are significant, it is the relationship between how the
costs are fully recovered and how the DWCF sets its prices that is of interest in this study.
Unfortunately, DBOF (now the DWCF) has failed to meet its goal of operating on a
break-even basis. In other words, it has not been able to fully recover the cost of its
operations. In fact, a 1997 GAO report, Defense Depot Maintenance, estimated that by
the end of fiscal year 1997, the operating loss across all funds would reach $1.7 billion
(GAO, 1997: 7). Today, the Funds continue to lose money. The problem lies in the fact
that the rates the Funds must charge are set as early as two years in advance of the budget
year and cannot be changed once included in the President’s Budget (PB). This lead-time
is necessary to provide customers the insight needed to plan and budget their resources.
As one might expect, by the time the current year rolls around, actual prices can change
dramatically, yet the customer is still charged the same rate established by the PB.
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Additionally, any loss incurred in a previous year must be added to the rates of the
subsequent year in an attempt to recoup those lost monies. As one of the DWCFs, the
Air Force Working Capital Fund has not been immune to these pricing deficiencies.
The AFWCF itself is separated into four distinct funds: the Supply Maintenance
Activity Group (SMAG), the Defense Maintenance Activity Group (DMAG), the
Information Services Activity Group (ISAG), and the United States Transportations
Command’s (USTRANSCOM) Transportation Working Capital Fund (TWCF) (Figure
2). The first three activity groups are the sole responsibility of the Air Force while the
TWCF has been placed under the AFWCF for cash management purposes. As previously
mentioned, the Funds sell unique goods and services to their customers. The SMAG
procures and manages supply items such as spares, fuels and general consumables. The
DMAG provides major overhaul, modification and repair services for aircraft, missiles,
engines and spare parts while the ISAG provides various information technology services
such as software development and computer support. Finally, the TWCF provides
valuable transportation support for day-to-day operations, as well as contingency
operations. Since each of these divisions of the AFWCF have unique missions, it is
expected that they would also have unique pricing strategies.
Research Focus
It is the unique pricing strategies of the activity groups that are of interest to the
researchers on this project. The DOD Financial Management Regulation 7000.14R,
Volume 2B, Chapter 9 states:
“The (Defense Working Capital) Fund includes a variety of activity groups that are
categorized in two groups for rate setting purposes.
1. Supply Management Activity groups. Utilize commodity costs in conjunction with a
surcharge to establish customer rates.
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2. Non-Supply Management Activity groups: Depot Maintenance, Research and
Development, Transportation, Distribution Depots, Base Support, and all other activity
groups have unit cost rates established based on identified output measures or
representative outputs. These output measures establish fully cost burdened rates per
output, such as a cost per direct labor hour, cost per product, cost per item received, cost
per item shipped, etc. The activity groups establish both their output rates and the
stabilized customer rates through the same general process.”

Air Force Working Capital Fund
AFWCF
Supply Management Activity Group
SMAG
Material Support Division
MSD
General Support Division
GSD

Depot Maintenance Activity Group
DMAG

Information Services Activity Group
ISAG

Organic Depots

Transportation Working Capital Fund
TWCF

Material Support Group
MSG

Oklahoma City Air Logistics Center
OC-ALC

Systems Support Group
SSG

Ogden Air Logistics Center
OO-ALC
Warner-Robins Air Logistics Center
WR-ALC
Contractor Depots

Figure 2. Air Force Working Capital Fund Organization
Based on the definitions above, the SMAG sets it rates based on the costs of its
goods plus a surcharge added across all product lines. On the other hand, the
DMAG and ISAG fall under the Non-Supply Activity Groups when setting their
rates and prices. Each uses an output measure to set its rates for services
provided. DMAG recovers cost of operations by charging customers a standard
rate per hour dependent upon which type of aircraft, missile, engine, etc. it
repairs; this is called the Direct Per Standard Hour (DPSH). ISAG recovers its
costs by charging an all-inclusive rate per Direct Labor Hour (DLH); in this case
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customers are charged the same rate per hour no matter what type of service they
are receiving.
The particular focus of this study is two-fold. First, an analysis of the
AFWCF’s performance will be conducted to determine how well the activity
groups are performing. The second concentration of this study is to determine if
the pricing strategy employed by the Materiel Support Division (MSD) of the
Supply Management Activity Group (SMAG) of the AFWCF preclude the DWCF
from meeting its goal of fully recovering all costs. In order to determine where
the division needs to make changes or improvements, the theory behind different
pricing strategies must be studied. These different theories will aid in identifying
a causal relationship between the price setting strategies employed and the regular
loss of revenue or customer demand, and determine why the Fund fails to breakeven.
Additionally, a recent study conducted by the RAND Corporation looked at the
pricing strategy of another DWCF organization, the Defense Finance and Accounting
Service (DFAS). DFAS provides assorted finance and accounting services to several
DOD components. Its current pricing strategy utilizes expected average costs to set rates.
The study found that a non-linear pricing strategy might be more appropriate than its
current pricing strategy based on the expected average costs of services provided. This
non-linear pricing schema allows DFAS to receive fixed annual payments from
customers at high levels while receiving per-unit payments throughout the year.
Additionally, they hypothesize that this type of pricing strategy may be suitable for other
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DWCF organizations (Gates, 2002). This study will determine if non-linear pricing is
appropriate for the MSD as well.
Research Questions
The intention of this research is to evaluate factors relevant to the pricing of
the AFWCF goods and services. The following research questions were
presented:
1. Are the goals of the DWCF reflected in the AFWCF Activity
Group’s pricing strategies?
2. How do the different Activity Groups under the AFWCF differ in
their pricing strategies? Is any Activity Group’s pricing strategy
allowing them to break-even?
3. How can the current pricing strategies be improved upon to come
nearer to meeting the DWCF’s goals? Where should the Air Force
focus its efforts to improve the MSD pricing strategy?
Methodology
The first portion of this research will be accomplished through a multiplecase design study where each activity groups of the AFWCF is a different case.
This study will be accomplished by obtaining financial data for fiscal years 19992002 (The GAO reported that prior to 1999, accounting records are not complete
enough to provide accurate data). I will look at the historical performance of the
AFWCF based on the Net Operating Result (NOR). Then I’ll narrow the scope to
identify how the individual activity groups are performing. This will again be
accomplished by analyzing the NORs along with revenue and expense categories.
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That information, along with information obtained through interviews of key
AFWCF personnel will assist in answering research questions one and two.
Then again, the focus will be narrowed to concentrate on the MSD portion
of the SMAG in a single-case design study. This division was chosen due to its
size and complexity; both of which will be explained in detail in chapter 2. We
will study the pricing strategy of this division and its performance over the past
few years. Based on information found in Chapter 2, we will determine how well
the division is performing and point out strengths and deficiencies of the current
pricing strategy based on commercial best practices.
Data necessary for this analysis will be obtained from budgeting and
accounting records, Budget Estimate Submissions (BES), the Air Force Total
Ownership Cost (AFTOC) system and through interviews with key Air Force
Working Capital Fund personnel from the Assistant Secretary, Financial
Management & Comptroller (SAF/FM), Washington, D.C., and Headquarters Air
Force Materiel Command (HQ AFMC), Wright-Patterson AFB, OH. In addition,
relevant information will be acquired from published regulations, policies, and
procedures.
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II. Literature Review
The purpose of this chapter is to examine and review literature applicable to
revolving funds and how they work, why the Defense Working Capital Fund (DWCF)
was formed, and current pricing strategies employed by the Air Force Working Capital
Funds (AFWCF). It will also include information on price setting that will aid in
determining if the strategy employed by the MSD is appropriate.
No different from civilian corporations, the Department of Defense (DoD) must
accurately price its goods and services to avoid operating at a loss. However, the DoD is
in a unique situation that most civilian corporations are not; the DoD is not in the
business to turn a profit but rather strives to break-even.
Background
To gain an understanding of the how the AFWCF sets its rates and prices, it is
first necessary to identify where the fund began and why it was established. As early as
the 1870s, the United States military procured materials from commercial vendors, held
these items in inventory, and resold them to the military forces as needed, recovering
only the cost of the item. The monies incurred from these sales were used to restock
inventories; thus the entire process repeated itself. This stock fund, which essentially
provides spare parts to its customers, (GAO, 2001) is known as a revolving fund due to
the cyclical nature of the buying and selling of goods. A revolving fund relies on the
revenue it receives from goods or services sold to sustain its operations. The military
introduced additional revolving-type funds in the 1940s to provide “industrial and
commercial-type services” to the operating forces such as depot maintenance activities.
Similar to the stock fund, the industrial fund was replenished with revenue from the sale
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of goods or services and more goods were purchased or more services provided.
However, the industrial funds recouped the cost of materials along with any additional
overhead costs (DWCF Handbook, Ch 2).
DBOF. The U.S. military operated under these funds until the early 1990s. In
October 1991, Deputy Secretary of Defense Donald Atwood established the Defense
Business Operations Fund (DBOF) (Jordan, 1995). This newly formed fund combined
the cash balances of the various industrial and stock funds into one centrally managed
account controlled by the Office of the Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) (GAO, 1997:
6). The purpose of establishing a centrally managed fund, as stated in the Defense
Management Review Decision 971, was “to provide better tools and information for
employees at every level of the support establishment, and to provide better information
to decision makers at every level” (Jordan, 1995). Furthermore, it was an effort to both
transform the way the Defense Department controlled its resources and encourage a more
business-like, buyer-seller relationship with its customers (GAO, 1997: 6).
The underlying goal of DBOF was total cost visibility while stressing the cost
consequences of decisions made by management (GAO, 1997: 9). Prior to the standup of
DBOF, there were few incentives for customers to control the goods or services due to
the absence of any relationship with the seller. The buyer ordered from the revolving
funds to replenish their supply inventory. However, all too often parts were ordered
simply because they were essentially free to the customer. Thus, many units were
placing orders for goods or services not essential to their operations and getting them, in
essence, for free. This concept is analogous to that of a new car with an all-inclusive
warranty. While a vehicle is under warranty, the manufacturer is responsible for
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repairing even the most minor problems at no charge to the customer. As such, there are
no incentives for the car owners to make repairs themselves or make trade-off decisions
on what they need repaired. Equally, revolving fund customers had no incentive to
control what they purchased or when they purchased it.
DBOF, on the other hand, was intended to dissuade this type of behavior. Under
the DBOF premise, Congress approves an annual budget for the customers and
distributes the appropriated funds. The customer uses these funds (Operations and
Maintenance money) for their day-to-day operations as well as any revolving fund goods
or services they require. With this limited budget, the customer must manage its funds
closely and often make critical choices where it will be spent; often having to forego
necessary orders due to lack of funds. This can create a problem for the warfighter due to
the fact that with the limited budget there is often a trade-off decision that must be made
between ordering wartime spares and repairing an aircraft. This too is like the car
warranty analogy. Fundamentally, when the customer’s warranty has run out, any repairs
are their responsibility. Now that the repairs are coming out of the car owner’s “budget”,
they will most likely only request essential repairs. Hence, with the advent of DBOF, the
revolving fund customer’s “warranty” had run out.
DWCF. In late 1996, the Defense Working Capital Fund (DWCF) was formed
through the reorganization of the one centrally managed DBOF fund into four separate
funds: the Army Working Capital Fund (AWCF), the Air Force Working Capital Fund
(AFWCF), the Navy Working Capital Fund (NWCF), and the Defense-wide Working
Capital Fund. According to the GAO, “This was done in order to clearly delineate the
responsibilities of the military services and Defense components for managing functional
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and financial aspects of their respective business areas” (GAO, 1997:1). The business
areas this statement refers to were established in April 1993. These ten areas consisted of
“relatively homogenous activities” in supply, depot maintenance, transportation,
communication, finance, information services, distribution, base support, Navy Labs, and
other (Jordan, 1995:39-40). Other goals of the DWCF, as described in Chapter 2 of the
DWCF Handbook, are as follows:
•
•
•

Providing a better way to control the costs of goods and services
Providing managers with increased flexibility and fiscal authority
Enhance reporting to provide true cost visibility

Though the dissolution of DBOF did not change the way the revolving funds did
business, it did provide even greater cash management while more clearly defining each
of the military component’s roles in the fund (DWCF Handbook: Ch2).
AFWCF. When DWCF was initially established it was broken into four
divisions: the Army WCF, the Navy WCF, the Air Force WCF and Other DoD WCF.
Each of these divisions had the authority to further disseminate their division into logical,
manageable activity groups. This research concerns the AFWCF and its activity groups.
In FY02, the AFWCF is expected to generate $20.5 billion of the $74.5 billion in revenue
expected by the DWCF (Cerda, 2002). Today the AFWCF is comprised of the Supply
Management Activity Group (SMAG), the Depot Maintenance Activity Group (DMAG),
and the Information Services Activity Group (ISAG). Furthermore, the AFWCF is
responsible for the cash management of the United States Transportation Command’s
(USTRANSCOM) Transportation Working Capital Fund (TWCF). Because this is the
only function the Air Force has with the TWCF, it is rarely included in AFWCF studies.
However, it will be included simply to show how this WCF is operating. Each of these
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activity groups has a unique mission and more often than not, is tied to one of the other
activity groups in a quite confusing fashion. In fact, the AFWCF activity groups are
often one another’s largest customers. However, before discussing their relationships
with one another, an introduction to their purpose is necessary.
SMAG. The Supply Management Activity Group (SMAG) has the responsibility
of providing inventory items, medical supplies, and various other support services and
materials (FMRS, Ch. 80). The SMAG was expected to generate $9.0 billion in revenue
in fiscal year 2002. It is broken into four divisions, each handling a specific aspect of the
SMAG. They include the Materiel Support Division (MSD), the General Support
Division (GSD), the Medical-Dental Division (MDD), and the Air Force Academy Store
Division (ACSD). Each division sells its goods or services to other Air Force
organizations and other AFWCF activity groups. MSD, the largest of the SMAG
divisions, is the wholesale division responsible for managing over 132,000 items in
inventory for aircraft, missiles and engines with expected revenues of $5.9 billion. It is
also responsible for supplying initial spares for Depot Level Reparables (DLR) to the
DMAG and purchases repair services from DMAG to make repair on exchangeable
DLRs so they can be returned to inventory. MSD works with DMAG at the Air Logistics
Centers across the Nation (Cerda, 2002). All remaining divisions of SMAG are retail
divisions. The GSD provides over 2.2 million consumable parts to its base and depot
level customers through the Defense Logistics Agency. It’s expected to produce $1.9
billion in revenue in fiscal year 2002. The MDD maintains in excess of 2500 items
across 83 bases through the Medical Logistics Office with expected revenues of $0.9
billion. Finally, the ACSD maintains and sells uniform items for Air Force Academy
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cadets at the United States Air Force Academy in Colorado Springs, CO. This entity is
the smallest of the four and has had no problems breaking even from year to year.
FY02 SMAG Revenue
$ (Billions)
$0.3
$0.9
$5.9
$1.9

MSD
GSD
MDD
ACSD

Figure 3. Projected SMAG Revenue- FY02
DMAG. According to the Air Force Working Capital Fund Overview, the Depot
Maintenance Activity Group (DMAG) is responsible for providing support at the depotlevel for “repair and modification of aircraft, missiles, and equipment; the overhaul of
engines and exchangeables; local manufacture; and area and base tenant support.” It
generates approximately thirty percent of the AFWCF revenue. And, it supports
operations from Air Logistics Centers (ALC) located throughout the United States: the
Warner-Robins ALC (WR-ALC), Robins AFB, GA; the Ogden ALC (OO-ALC) located
at Hill AFB, UT; and the Oklahoma City ALC (OC-ALC) at Tinker AFB, OK. Each of
these divisions is responsible for several types of weapons systems. For instance, when a
KC-135 needs repairs, it is sent to the OC-ALC. When an F-15 needs modifications it is
sent to the WR-ALC. It is also important to note that the DMAG has both organic repair
facilities and contract repair facilities. The organic facilities generate 60 percent of the
DMAG revenue with the inorganic facilities generating the remaining 40 percent. DMAG
has control over what prices are charged for the organic facilities but prices charged by
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the contract facilities are set in the binding contract with the Air Force or Department of
Defense.
FY02 DMAG Revenue
$ (Billions)
Organic
Inorganic

$2.5

$3.7

Figure 4. Projected DMAG Revenue- FY02
ISAG. Finally, the Information Services Activity Group is the provider of
information services and information technology solutions for the Air Force.
Particularly, this AG analyzes requirements, designs and develops systems, and performs
testing and integration for its customers along with support services. It generates the
smallest amount of revenue for the AFWCF with an expected FY02 generation of only
$0.6 billion (Cerda, 2002). The ISAG is separated into two divisions, each generating
approximately equal revenues, known as the Central Design Agencies (CDA): the
Materiel Systems Group (MSG), and the Standard Systems Group (SSG).
FY02 ISAG Revenue
$ (Billions)

$0.3
$0.3

Figure 5. Expected ISAG Revenue- FY02
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MSG
SSG

As its name implies, SSG has the responsibility of supporting base level computer
systems Air Force wide. On the other hand, MSG is responsible for maintaining the
logistics systems within the Air Force Materiel Command (AFMC) (AFWCF Overview,
80-7).
The Relationship
The workings of the AFWCF could be described as an “incestuous relationship”.
All the Activity Groups require goods and services from one another. As such, the
transfer of goods or services to each other creates cyclical funds transfers. An
oversimplified example of the relationship between the activity groups follows:
1. Customer orders part from Supply (SMAG) with program sustained by ISAG
2. SMAG checks inventory for part and if part is in stock, issues it and bills
customer; otherwise, requests it from DMAG
3. DMAG sends part to SMAG and bills SMAG for part
4. SMAG sends part to customer and bills customer for part
5. ISAG supported programs track parts and inventory

Customer

SMAG

DMAG

ISAG

Figure 6. AFWCF Relationship
As one can plainly see from the example, each of the Activity Groups relies on the others
to get their job done. And, though the process seems simple enough in the example, it is
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hardly that. In fact, the entire AFWCF process is a delicate balance of give and take on
all sides. This research examines the rate setting process of the Materiel Support
Division of the Supply Management Activity Group.
Pricing
Pricing is a means for an organization to meet its goals and objectives. As those
goals and objectives differ, so does the way a price is built. Pricing accurately can lead to
a successful business while inaccurate pricing can lead to destruction. “Setting a price,
just any price, is easy”, (Engelson, 1995: 6). Although this statement is true, it fails to
mention that price is directly related to the revenue it generates. Daly suggests there are
three possible outcomes of establishing prices. First, setting prices above what
consumers will tolerate may drive customers elsewhere and send revenues down.
Second, setting prices too low (under pricing) may increase sales yet make the sale
unprofitable. Finally, the most sought after outcome occurs when prices are set properly,
resulting in sales and profits (Daly, 2002: 1). It appears that the AFWCF is the victim of
inappropriate pricing. Though the Fund does not operate on the premise of making a
profit, the continual losses from year to year indicate that it can’t even operate as
intended, on a break-even basis. And, to recoup the prior years losses and try again to
break-even, it must in fact set its prices with profit in mind; profit being equal to the
amount of the previous years losses. So, in order for the Fund to meet its break-even
goal, it must price with profit in mind. Yet, how realistic is it to expect the fund to breakeven at all?
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Pricing Strategy
“Price is the value or worth of something”, (Engelson, 1995: 20). “Strategy is the
coordination of multiple activities to achieve a common objective…” (Holden and Nagle,
2002: 149). Together, these definitions imply that a pricing strategy must accurately
value the organization’s goods and/or services, while striving to attain corporate goals. It
is important to note that price setting and strategic pricing are different. Holden and
Nagle identify that price setting is “reacting to market conditions” while pricing
strategically is being proactive in managing prices (Holden and Nagle, 2002: 149).
These differences can either send a company’s profits soaring or launch them straight
into bankruptcy. If the AFWCF were a public corporation, it would have filed
bankruptcy long ago. Most organizations cannot tolerate the sustained losses experienced
by the AFWCF. As of 1997, the total losses for the DWCF had topped $1.7 billion.
Thus, the pricing strategy utilized by the AFWCF, or any corporation for that matter, is
imperative to its success.
Most companies set their prices on a cost-plus foundation where they set prices by
summing all direct and indirect costs, then add an additional percentage above the price
solely for profit. This is not the goal of the AFWCF. O’Guin (1991) states that “pricing
reflects each competitor’s costs, barriers to entry and capacity, as well as customer
desirability, available income, and other factors” (O’Guin, 1991: 256).
The authors of Consumer Behavior and Marketing Behavior have developed a
six-stage approach to developing a pricing strategy. Most elements stated by O’Guin
(1991) are reflected in this process. They claim that their approach is different from the
traditional approaches to strategic pricing in that their process focuses more on consumer
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analysis (Olson and Peter, 1996: 593). The approach, as presented by the authors, is as
follows:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Analyze consumer-product relationships.
Analyze the environmental situation.
Determine the role of price in marketing strategy
Estimate relevant production and marketing costs.
Set pricing objectives.
Develop pricing strategy and set prices.

Though this approach is meant primarily for the private sector, several stages are
pertinent to the AFWCF as well. An analysis of each step follows.
Step 1: Analyze Consumer-Product Relationships
The first step in the strategic pricing approach is perhaps the most important.
This step is where you determine what the consumers needs are and how they affect your
product. In the case of the AFWCF, this step is synonymous to obtaining customer
requirements at the beginning of the two-year price-setting process. Since total costs are
divided by the number of requirements to obtain the AFWCF rates, you can see how this
step can either raise rates out of control by customers underestimating their requirements,
or rates can end up lower than needed to recoup all costs if customers underestimate their
requirements. This is shown in Table 1 below.
Table 1. Requirements Estimation Example

Total Costs ($)
# Of Engines
Required
Price per Engine ($)

Overestimated Underestimated
Requirements
Requirements
1,000,000
1,000,000
7
142,857

3
333,333

As you can see from this simple example, the customer has a significant impact on what
they will be charged. Specifically, it would be in the best interest of the customer to
overestimate requirements. If only one organization overestimates their workload the
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impact to the overall AFWCF would be insignificant. However, what happens if several
organizations overestimate their requirements for several years? This may be what is
causing the AFWCF to lose money each year. The point is the consumer plays a massive
role in determining the financial health of the AFWCF.
Step 2: Analyze the Environmental Situation
Environmental elements should also be considered when determining what
pricing strategy to use. Early consideration of these elements can bring to light risk
factors so proactive measures can be taken. This step is primarily used to obtain
information about competitors in the market. For instance, it is necessary to know how
many competitors your company faces along with any pertinent information about their
products, price structure, and financial strength (Olson and Peter, 1996: 596). But, it can
also be used to consider the customer’s impact on the environment. For instance, in the
AFWCF environment, the customer is working with a limited budget. Once those
monies are expended, they will not purchase any more services. So, it’s important to
realize that price determines the workload in the depots. If prices are too high, the
customer will not be able to send as many aircraft through the depots for repairs or
modifications. On the other hand, if the prices are too low, the customer may send more
workload to the product centers than originally intended thus exceeding the maximum
workload of the centers. There is a fine balance between many factors that must be taken
into account.
Determining what value the customer places on the product or service will aid in
identifying an appropriate pricing strategy. The value a customer places on an item is
actually a compilation of several factors including product or service quality, costs and
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intangible costs and benefits. It is important to understand this mix and adjust the price
accordingly (Ferrell et al., 2002: 130). The customer’s value can be viewed as an output
of this formula:

PerceivedValue = CustomerBenefits ÷ CustomerCosts
This stage of the strategic pricing approach is not as important to the AFWCF as
to commercial businesses. First of all, the AFWCF does not have many competitors in its
“market”. In essence, the AFWCF works like a monopoly. It has goods or services that
cannot be obtained outside of the DoD or its contractors. Because of this situation, its
customers must rely on the AFWCF to set prices that will allow them to meet the needs
of the warfighter. Therefore, the value that the customer places on the products are not as
important in the price setting scheme because more often than not they have to purchase
the product from an internal source. As expected, the environmental elements of the
AFWCF are considerably different than those encountered by the private sector.
Some additional environmental factors include:
• Current and Future Threats
o Where and when will the DoD be called upon to respond?
• Technology Advancements
o Advances in technology are continually occurring and must be
addressed to remain superior
• Contract Modifications
o Changes to current agreements with DoD Suppliers of goods and
services
• Budget Constraints/Cuts
o Money is continually being shuffled from one program to another
Step 3: Determine the Role of Price in Marketing Strategy
This step helps the company determine the role price plays in their ability to sell
their product. There are different strategies used to gain a better hold on the market. For
instance, if a company wants to flood the market with their item, they may price it lower
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than their competitor to gain sales and notoriety. It is important to understand, however,
that the price of a product may not always play a role in its sale. There are several other
aspects of sales that customers may prefer like free shipping, high quality products or
extended warranties that override a higher price (Olson and Peter, 1996: 597).
Determining the importance of price is also essential to the success of any pricing
strategy. One source suggests two specific reasons why pricing gets so much attention.
First, revenue is easy to understand. Unlike many other aspects of marketing, revenue
has little complexity to it; it is simply price times quantity. As such, there are only two
ways that a company can increase its revenue: by increasing the quantity it sells or raising
the selling price. Both, however, are profoundly controlled by price. Second,
management views price as one of the easiest variables to influence. Ferrell et al. (2002)
imply that since price is the easiest aspect to change, it gets the most attention. The time
it takes to change a product design can take months or years. Prices in the commercial
sector can be raised with little effort or thought. Think of the last time you drove by a gas
station in the morning to see one price and drove by in the evening to see yet another
price. It is the effortlessness of changing prices that can wreak havoc on a company’s
pricing posture. And, more often than not, rapidly adjusting prices to vary to demand
does not mean that the company is accurately setting prices. They are simply reacting to
the immediate situation (Ferrell et al., 2002: 128).
The AFWCF is in a unique position when it comes to their marketing strategy.
First, as mentioned before, the consumer plays a large role in price development by
submitting product and service requirements at the beginning of the AFWCF budget
process. Second, the AFWCF market is very small due to the monopolistic nature of the
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business. The only areas truly affected by an outside market are the GSD and MDD of
the SMAG. Both of these divisions sell products that are readily available from private
businesses. Finally, the marketing strategy is one that it is constrained by laws,
regulations and directives. There is not much leeway when it comes to the options the
AFWCF has to operate its business-like structure.
Step 4: Estimate Relevant Production and Marketing Costs
Concerning production and marketing costs, Olson and Peter do not give enough
consideration to this area. They simply state that knowing the costs of marketing and
production will enable the company to regard the variable prices of products, thus
enabling them to determine the minimum price they must charge to enter the market
(Olson and Peter, 1996: 597).
Though this area received little attention by Olson and Peter, and may not be of
great importance in the private sector, it is of great interest to the AFWCF. The accurate
estimation of workload and supply requirements is the key to a successful AFWCF. By
accurately estimating workload, rates will be set close to where they should be.
However, no estimate is accurate! By using historical data and identifying past
deficiencies, future prices can be set more accurately. Granted, there are several
unknowns when setting prices two-years in advance of the budget execution year but this
risk can be managed with proper price setting techniques that will be discussed later.
This also goes back to step two, where the environmental factors are evaluated. The
military does not operate in a vacuum. There are new challenges every day that force
personnel and systems to adapt. By identifying the key areas where change may occur
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with the most adverse affects, you have taken a proactive approach to correctly
identifying accurate costs.
Step 5: Set Pricing Objectives
Perhaps the most crucial step prior to developing the pricing strategy is setting the
pricing objectives. A company must identify its goals in order for it to obtain them.
Olson and Peter (1996) identified the top pricing objectives used by the private sector
today. They pointed out that the most common one is realizing a specific return on
investment. Other objectives include increasing sales, maximizing long run and short run
profits, growth, targeting a market share and desensitizing the customer to price (Olsen
and Peter, 1996: 598). Each objective meets the needs of a different corporate strategy.
The AFWCF uses the objective of breaking-even over time. It is also appropriate to
attempt to desensitize customers to the price. The less the customer feels angst about the
price of the goods or services, the more business the depot receives and the better the
chances are that the AFWCF will be close to breaking even. There are too many fixed
costs in organizations like the ALCs. Civilian Pay and Benefits is one expense in the
ALCs that does not change in proportion to the workload. They must have enough
personnel on hand to manage the expected workload. And due to policies governing
civilian personnel, lay-offs are not an option. When their workload decreases, their costs
remain the same, so a loss will most definitely occur. Yet it may be impossible to
desensitize the AFWCF customers to price since most of them are working within limited
budget constraints set forth by the Congress.
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Step 6: Develop Pricing Strategy and Set Prices
The pricing strategy is the key element in determining either the success or failure
of a company. Once all the other steps have been accomplished, it is necessary to choose
a pricing strategy that will aid the company in achieving its goals. With the private sector
in mind, Olson and Peter (1996) listed three tasks necessary to produce an applicable
pricing strategy. First, prices must be set far enough above costs to produce the level of
revenue desired. Second, choose a pricing strategy that is in harmony with the marketing
strategy. Last, the prices must be strategically set so demand is generated while keeping
in mind that the customer will have the opportunity to make trade-off decisions.
Furthermore, the corporation must remember that “most price changes occur as a result of
changes in consumers, the environment, competition, costs, strategies, and objectives”,
(Olson and Peter, 1996: 599).
Pricing Methods
The choice of pricing method depends on the many factors mentioned above.
What follows are several pricing strategies commonly used today. However, it is
important to keep in mind that many of these strategies might not work for the AFWCF.
This is because (1) the AFWCF operates to recover its costs only, (2) AFWCF customers
have a limited budget that is often only adjusted downward, (3) the “market” the AFWCF
operates in is autonomous, and (4) the AFWCF implements transfer pricing due to its
relationship with primarily internal customers. This portion of the chapter will focus on
identifying pricing strategies that are principally based around the transfer-pricing
concept including Cost-Based pricing, Cost-Plus pricing, Rate-of-Return pricing, MarketBased pricing, Value-Based Pricing and Activity Based Costing.
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Internal Transfer Pricing
Internal transfer pricing is a common category of pricing often used by companies
to avoid taxation of sales of products to its other divisions. Transfer pricing is a “system
of pricing the transfer of goods, services and intangibles between entities of one
multinational enterprise” (Pagan and Wilkie, 2001: 15). A transfer price is simply a
mechanism for pricing products sold from one division of a company to another division
of the same company. In the case of the AFWCF, a sale to a DoD customer should be
sold with a transfer price. Similarly, a sale from the MSD to the DMAG is also a transfer
price. Revenue is created from the sale of the product from MSD and constitutes an
expense as a buy for the DMAG. The operating income of both of these internal
organizations is affected by the same transaction. One source asserts that transfer pricing
should “promote goal congruence and a sustained high level of management effort”
(Datar et al., 2000: 793). These factors are inline with the goals and operations of the
AFWCF. As such, the type of transfer price used deserves as much scrutiny as external
pricing does.
Common Transfer Pricing Strategies
Cost-Based Pricing
This pricing method uses the cost of producing the product or service to set the
price. The full-cost of the product is included in the price. Factors include fixed and
variable costs of the product along with direct and indirect production costs. Most often
the price is set by using the budgeted costs of an item because collecting actual cost data
can be time consuming and too costly (Datar et al., 2001: 794). There are two
approaches under cost-based pricing that will be discussed briefly: cost- plus and rate-of-
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return. Each has similar goals but distinct differences. And though the cost-based
approach is simple, its major weakness is that it fails to take into account any of the
external market factors such as value or demand, making it difficult for management to
determine how much it will sell. However, it is suitable to use this method when
obtaining market data is too time consuming or too costly (Datar et al., 2001: 797-799).
Cost-Plus Pricing
The goal of cost-plus pricing is to make a profit. As mentioned earlier, cost-plus
strives to account for all costs associated with a product and then adds a rate to the
average variable costs (Cintron, 2002: 9). This rate recovers any indirect costs associated
with the product and includes any profit the company wishes to make. The benefit of this
method is the seller knows how much profit it makes from the sale of each item.
Rate-of-Return Pricing
This method is very similar to the cost-plus method above. However, the
difference lies in the fact that instead of arbitrarily marking up the price to make a profit,
the price is increased to reach a desired rate-of-return. Cintron (2002) does a thorough
job of explaining this method in his thesis. He uses the following example:
“Suppose a manufacturer has the following costs and sales expectations:
Variable cost per unit
$
10
Fixed cost
300,000
Expected unit sales
50,000
The manufacturer’s unit cost is given by:
Unit cost = variable cost + (fixed costs/units sales)
= $10 + ($300,000/50,000) = $16
Now assume the manufacturer wants to earn a 20 percent markup on sales. The
manufacturer’s markup price is given by:
Mark-up price = unit cost / (1-desired return on sales) = $16 / (1-0.20) = $20
The manufacturer would charge $20 per product and make a profit of $4 per unit
(Cintron, 2002: 9).”
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Though both of these methods are widely used and easy to understand and explain, they
are not the best methods for pricing. Neither of them takes into account value, demand or
competition. As a result, the seller never knows if they will reach their desired rate-of
return or profit level (Kotler, 2000: 466).
Market-Based Pricing
The strength of market-based pricing is the demise of cost-based pricing. This
method of accounting focuses on how customers react to fluctuations in the price and
concentrates on the market conditions. Two examples of market-based pricing are
explained below.
Value-Based Pricing
This method of pricing falls inline with steps two and three of Olsen and Peters
(1996) strategic pricing method. This strategy sets prices based on the perception the
customer has of the value of the product. Value is a relative term that has different
meanings for all consumers. It is a mix of everything the customer values in your
product. Recall the perceived value formula earlier in this chapter. It says that value
is equal to customer benefits divided by customer costs. Ferrell et al’s list of possible
benefit and cost components is below.
As one can see, the components in Figure 7 encompass almost every aspect of an
organization. Put simply, the main premise of this method is that the consumer
strives to get the “biggest bang for the buck.” Holding all the components constant, a
consumer will buy from the store with the lowest price. It is the value of the
components that lead to trade-off decisions and ultimately a sale. For instance,
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suppose that there are two products available from different manufacturers for the
same price. Since price is no longer an issue for the consumer, they will turn to
Customer Benefits
Core Product Quality
Product Features
Brand Name
Durability
Ease of Use
Warranties and Guarantee
Customer Service Quality
Reliability
Responsiveness
Timeliness
Experience-Based Quality
Retail Atmosphere and décor
Advertising and Publicity
Entertainment Benefits

Customer Costs
Monetary Costs
Transactional Costs
Retail of wholesale price
Delivery Charges
Sales Tax
Licensing Fees
Life Cycle Costs
Maintenance Costs
Repair Costs
Replacement Costs
Nonmonetary Costs
Time
Effort
Risk
Opportunity Costs

Figure 7. Components of Customer Benefits and Customer Costs
(Ferrell

et al, 2002: 102)

other aspects of the product or product’s company to make their purchase decision.
Perhaps company A has a reputation for great customer service and prompt attention
to problems, while the other company’s product is a relatively unknown brand name
or has a reputation of not being very durable. The consumer will most likely choose
company A. It is this information that it necessary for the company to accurately set
its prices. It needs to know not only what the customer’s perceived value is, but also
the perceived value of the other competitor’s in the market (Ferrell et al., 2002, 102).
Activity Based Costing
Although outside the realm of price setting, Activity Based Costing (ABC) can
play a vital role in the price setting process, particularly when it comes to cost-based
pricing. Prices are only as good as the cost allocation method associated with it. ABC is
a method used to allocate indirect costs to products or product lines. The most common
method or allocation of indirect costs is to arbitrarily spread the support costs of an
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operation across all products and product lines at the same rate, perhaps 15% is added to
all products to cover overhead costs. This method of allocating costs is flawed in that it
often allocates too much overhead to one product and not enough to another. This leads
to under pricing and overpricing of goods and services, which will affect revenue
generation.
With ABC, overhead costs are allocated to the appropriate products or product
lines that are creating the indirect costs. There is no more “peanut butter spreading” of
the costs to all products. For instance, there are more costs associated with holding an
engine in inventory than holding a bolt. The engine takes up more floor space and should
be allocated more of the inventory warehouse costs. Using ABC can assist an
organization in finding out what the true cost drivers are in the company and lead to more
accurate pricing. However, ABC is often expensive and difficult to implement. Before
an ABC method is used in conjunction with a pricing method, a cost-benefit analysis
must be performed to see if the expected benefits will outweigh the expected costs.
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III. Methodology
Overview
The methodology behind this research effort was an exploratory study of the
AFWCF. To answer questions about the overall health of the AFWCF, a multiple case
study was used where the activity groups of the AFWCF were each a case: these included
SMAG, DMAG, ISAG and TWCF. Comparisons of the NOR were evaluated among the
groups so conclusions about the efficiency of their operations and accuracy of their
pricing strategy could be made. The focus then switched to a single case study of the
Materiel Support Division’s pricing strategy compared against commercial best practices.
With this approach, we were able to focus on what was motivating the continually
growing Accumulated Operating Result (AOR). Throughout the research effort,
concentration was aimed at obtaining answers to the research questions outlined in
Chapter 1.
Research Design
The most important step when determining which research approach to use is the
definition of the research questions (Yin, 1994: 7). This particular research builds on a
March 2002 thesis written by First Lieutenant Edwin Cintron, An Analysis of the Pricing

Strategy of a Government Fee-For-Service Organization. Cintron’s (2002) research
focused on the pricing strategy of the Materiel Support Group, a division of the ISAG.
The author studied this primarily service oriented organization and found that the
accuracy of its pricing strategy is limited by its inability to make changes in a timely
fashion, due in large part to the restrictions forced on it by the DoDFMR. He further
points out that it may be beneficial to research other areas of the AFWCF and see what
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type of impact they have on meeting the objectives of the DWCF. As such, this research
was born.
The next step determined which research strategy to use. Yin suggests that there
are three conditions that will aid in determining which strategy to use: “(a) the type of
research questions, (b) the control the investigator has over the actual behavioral events
and (c) the focus on a contemporary phenomenon within some real-life context” (Yin,
1994: 1). The fact that this research asks how and why questions, the researchers have no
control over the events and it focuses on contemporary events leads to the archival
analysis and the case study analysis. However, the archival process should only be used
when data is historical. The data necessary for this analysis, though past data, is recent;
and so, this study was deemed a multiple case study with a single case focus (Yin, 1994:
5-7).
Data Collection
The data collection phase of this research was an iterative process that used
numerous resources. The first step in answering the research questions was to obtain
financial figures from fiscal years 1999 through 2002, in particular, the Budget Estimate
Submission (BES) for the Air Force Working Capital Fund. These documents provided
expected and actual revenues and expenditures along with bottom-line figures for the
AOR and NOR. The NOR is the Net Operating Result of the fund each year. If this
number is negative, the fund has lost money and it must be recouped in a subsequent
year. If it is positive at the end of the fiscal year, there is a surplus that will be absorbed
back into the fund, resulting in lower prices to the customers. The AOR is the
Accumulated Operating Result, which is the sum of the NORs since the funds inception.
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The AOR and NOR are the measures for the health of the AFWCF. It is these figures
that we want as close to zero as possible from year to year.
Next, to analyze the operations of the Materiel Support Division, the current
pricing strategy of the division, along with any proposed changes, had to be identified.
This information was obtained from SAF/FMBMR and HQ AFMC/LGIF. A
comparative analysis was then performed to determine if MSD was inline with
commercial best practices outlined in the literature review.
In addition to gathering numerical data, it was essential to interview personnel
working in the WCF field to collect information not readily available through other
avenues such as reports, regulations and directives. The hands-on experience of these
personnel provided valuable insight into the business operations of the AFWCF.
Valuable information was also gathered at the Air Force Working Capital Fund Summit
at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base in October 2002, and at the Cost-Per Flying Hour
Conference in Columbus, Ohio in September 2002.
Data Analysis
Like the data collection phase, and even more so, the data analysis phase of this
research was an iterative process. The first step in the analysis was to use the data from
the BES to determine the overall position of the AFWCF. This was done by simply
graphing the AOR and NOR data included in the BES. The next step was to graph the
AOR and NOR data for each of the four activity groups: SMAG, DMAG, ISAG and
TWCF. This illustrated which of the funds was having the most difficult time meeting
the goal of breaking even and outlined which activity groups could be driving the Fund’s
performance. After the visual inspection, a bivariate correlation was conducted amongst
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the AFWCF and each of its activity groups. This helped determine which areas, if any,
were true statistically significant drivers of the AFWCF’s overall performance.
Then, the scope was altered to establish how accurate the initial estimates were
when compared to actual revenues and expenses. By computing a growth factor for each
of the activity groups at the Total Income and Total Expense levels as outlined in the
BES, a determination was made as to how the Fund was operating. Again, statistical
analysis was performed to test the significance of the results.
Finally, estimating consistencies were identified among the specific revenue and
expense categories for each of the activity groups and the average over or under
estimation was computed. A consistency was defined as a revenue or expense category
that was being either overestimated for all years being reviewed or underestimated during
all years under review. If an activity group underestimated a category in one year and
overestimated that same category in a different year, it was not considered to be
consistent. After identifying which areas were consistent estimating problems for the
activity groups, common categories among all the activity groups was identified. The
goal was to determine if there was an area of the budget process that needed more
attention. Perhaps personnel are not as accurate at determining the requirements or prices
as they thought.
Data analysis for the MSD portion of this study was conducted in conjunction
with the literature review. This resulted in a comparative analysis of MSD’s pricing
strategy to Olsen and Peter’s (1996) six-step pricing process. The primary goal of this
part was to determine if MSD is aligned with commercial best pricing practices.
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Summary
This research employs both a multiple-case and a single-case study design with
the four activity groups of the AFWCF contained in the multiple-case study and the
Materiel Support Division of the Supply Management Activity Group as the case in the
single case study. The case study was considered most appropriate due to the type of
questions being asked, the lack of control over the events and the context of the case.
Data collection was obtained through databases, interviews and documents. While data
analysis was accomplished through a comparison of budgeted and actual data along with
statistical verification or results.
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IV. Analysis
Overview
This research endeavor focused on several aspects of the Air Force Working
Capital Fund. First, its purpose was to determine if the goals of the DWCF were
reflected in the current pricing strategies of the AFWCF based on the AFWCF’s
performance. Second, it examined how the pricing strategies of the AFWCF activity
groups differ and seeks to determine if any of the Activity Groups are able to break even.
Finally, based on current commercial pricing practices, determine if the current pricing
strategy of the Materiel Support Division of the Supply Management Activity Group, the
largest single division of the AFWCF, can be improved upon while making suggestions
where the Air Force should focus it improvement efforts. Responses to these questions
will provide insight into the implications behind an appropriate pricing strategy and aid in
educating the AFWCF community.
AFWCF Performance
The majority of DoD literature encountered during this investigation stated in one
way or another that the WCF was failing to operate as intended. Yet, none of this
literature stated whether or not the changes the WCF has been encountering in the past
few years has resulted in a positive or negative impact on the fund, due in part to the fact
that the only acceptable performance of the Fund is when it is able to break-even. So, the
first step in determining if the goals of the DWCF are reflected in the current pricing
strategies was to analyze past performance data. This will enable us to see where the
AFWCF is working and where improvements can be made. We will first look at the
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AFWCF and its activity groups in their broadest sense and then delve down into more
explanatory aspects like revenues and expenses.
The Net Operating Result, NOR, is undoubtedly the most important indicator of
the effectiveness of the AFWCF operation. Recall that this is the variance between the
expected results and the actual results in a single year. When there is a positive NOR in a
given year, this money will be returned to the fund in a subsequent year, ultimately
driving down prices customers pay in the short run. However, and as equally often the
case, the NOR is a negative amount (Figure 8). This means that the Fund’s total expenses
have surpassed its total revenue. This money must be recouped in a subsequent year,
thus artificially raising prices the customers are charged. This artificial inflation of prices
creates undue hardship on the customers of the Fund. Rather than paying a fair price for
goods or services, they are paying prices that are often higher than their budgets will
allow and higher than prices found in the commercial sector. This results in a reduction
in the revenue the Fund will receive since customers are unable to purchase as many
goods or services at the inflated rate, which ultimately drives the Fund’s loss. Or,
revenue is lost due to the customer purchasing their goods from the private sector if
available.
The other measure of the AFWCF’s position from year to year is the
Accumulated Operating Result (AOR). This number is the cumulative gain or loss since
the inception of the fund in 1991. One would think that due to the regulatory
requirements set forth by the Department of Defense Financial Management Regulation
(DoDFMR) that the AOR would have to be zero every year. The reason there is a
balance in this category is due to the lag in recovering the NOR. By the time it is
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determined that FY00 has a negative NOR for the year, it is too late to recover it in FY01
because this budget has already been approved and execution has begun for FY01. So,
the AOR rides until the next fiscal year where it is supposed to be recovered. However,
when FY02’s budget is executed, the NOR that had occurred in FY01 must either be
recouped or reintroduced. So, the cumulative loss of the fund can grow before anything
is recovered. This is what is often referred to as the downward death spiral. The problem
keeps getting worse, that is to say that the negative AOR keeps growing larger, before it
has a chance to recover. This problem has been recognized and over $1.2 billion was
introduced into the Fund in fiscal year 2003 to zero out the AOR, thus balancing the Fund
for the first time since its establishment.
Yet, it is still important to recognize how well the fund has performed over the
past few fiscal years. This was accomplished by obtaining the NOR from Budget
Estimate Submissions (BES) for fiscal years 1997 to 2001. The results are displayed in
Figure 8.
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Figure 8. AFWCF AOR & NOR (FY97-FY01)
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As one can see from the graph in Figure 8 above, there has been a great deal of
fluctuation in the fund’s operation over the past fiscal years. The NOR has an oscillating
pattern with a decreasing trend. The trendline shows that the variance in the annual NOR
is decreasing as the Fund matures. This suggests that the Fund is coming increasingly
closer to operating as intended. Still, some of the vast fluctuation can be explained by the
fact that the prior year’s AOR is being recouped so the NOR is either a great deal larger
or smaller than it should’ve been. Technically, the NOR should be at zero once the
previous year’s AOR has been recouped from or reintroduced into the Fund.
Two significant problems have been identified with the way the AFWCF or any
of the DWCFs operate. The first is the time lag between the initial budget submission
and the budget execution. In the FY97 BES, the estimators predicted that the FY99 NOR
would be approximately -$83.5 million (Figure 9). This however was based on the fact
that the AOR at the end of FY98 was +$35.9 million. By the time the FY97 budget was
approved, the FY98 AOR had been updated to +$415.2 million and the FY99 NOR to
-$390.3 million. And, once the FY99 budget execution was completed, the FY98 AOR
sat at +$289.1 and the FY99 NOR was +$214.1 million.
$ Millions

FY 99 Requested

FY 99 Approved

FY 99 Actual

Revenues

19,247.981

19,404.879

19,645.718

Expenses

19,373.819

19,221.631

19,529.049

(83.548)

(390.324)

214.065

35.859

415.191

289.083

NOR
Prior Year AOR

Figure 9. FY 99 AFWCF Operating Results
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It is evident that the initial expectations of the Funds operation swing by as much as $372
million when the initial estimations are compared to the acutals. This is unacceptable by
any standard. Yet regrettably, it is mostly unavoidable.
The timeline used by the Fund to set its prices is not only prescribed by laws and
regulations, but is necessary to ensure that customers have enough lead time to build and
submit their POMs so they can identify where they should spend their budgets. On the
other hand, when fluctuations are as widely distributed as they have been, it may be just
as easy to use a best guess approach when submitting the initial estimates. As with any
estimation, they are just that, an estimate, and by definition they will never be 100%
accurate because analysts are not fortunate enough to have a crystal ball There are, of
course, other ways to set prices but they do not take into account the large role the
customer plays in the AFWCF.
The second problem with the Fund is the way the AOR is recouped. This has
been a longstanding issue within the Fund. In the early 1990s, the AOR just rode from
year to year in the Fund, and got larger each year. But this was soon recognized as a
problem because the Fund was losing capital that wasn’t being recouped. So, in the mid1990s, the AOR was required to be recouped from the Fund within the year of execution
in an attempt to zero it out. This was impossible to achieve due to the budget constraints
of the customers. The problem was that customers were budgeting for one amount and
were being asked to pay a larger amount. By raising these prices within the year of
execution, customers were unable to purchase as many goods or services as they had
initially projected in their POMs. So, the AFWCF received less revenue than it had
anticipated due to the decreased customer requirements but had many of the same
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expenses. This again increased the AOR negatively. There appeared to be no solution to
this problem that didn’t end up doing more harm than good. Later, the AOR was
recovered in a subsequent fiscal year. This worked better because the AOR was now
budgeted for in a later fiscal year. Yet, there were still many unforeseen factors that
arose causing the revenues or expenses to fluctuate widely from the anticipated amounts.
Presently, one of the Activity Groups has undergone a change in the way the AOR is
recouped that appears to have a very positive affect on the Fund. This will be discussed
in the MSD Pricing Strategy.
Recall that the NOR is recovered in a year after it is incurred. Referring to the
graph in Figure 8, in FY97, there was a loss of approximately $200 million in the NOR
and then the FY99 AOR had a large increase. Why such a large fluctuation? If the Fund
only needed to recoup $200 million, why was there a large spike in the Funds operating
result the next year? This may be the result of overcompensation. In order to make up
the negative funds lost in FY97, the AFWCF needed to recoup the money in FY99 which
meant raising prices. Maybe they raised the prices too high when incorporating the
negative NOR into the Fund. The behavior of the fund is erratic at best. Perhaps this
can be better explained by observing how the individual activity groups were performing
during this same timeframe since the four activity group’s data were consolidated to
arrive at the AFWCF’s results.
We expect to see the same erratic behavior in each of the activity groups as we
have seen in the AFWCF. With the exception of ISAG, a quick look at each of the
activity group’s performance measures shows a similarly inconsistent pattern (Figure 10).
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Activity Group NORs (FY97 - FY01)
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Figure 10. Activity Group NORs
When compared to Figure 8, we see that the consolidated NOR of the AFWCF most
closely follows the pattern of the SMAG. A look at each of the Activity Groups
individually will provide a better understanding of their impact on the Fund as a whole.
First, consider the SMAG data. This is the largest of the Activity Groups so it is
reasonable that any fluctuations in its operation have the largest impact on the Fund
overall. Notice in Figure 11 how the SMAG data trend closely resembles the AFWCF
data. This verifies the large effect the SMAG has on the AFWCF.
Looking at the graph in Figure 12 shows the DMAG NOR against the AFWCF
NOR. The trend between the two is similar but does not provide evidence that DMAG is
a large contributor to the Fund’s overall performance; it isn’t nearly as obviously driving
the Fund’s outcome as the SMAG’s fluctuation is.
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AFWCF NOR vs. SMAG NOR
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Figure 11. AFWCF NOR vs. SMAG NOR

AFWCF NOR vs. DMAG NOR
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Figure 12. AFWCF NOR vs. DMAG NOR
Looking at the ISAG NOR below, there appears to be significantly less
correlation than the previous two (Figure 13). The ISAG NOR is so small in comparison
to the entire AFWCF that it hardly shows up when compared against the AFWCF NOR
in the same graph, in fact there appears to be no fluctuation at all. Yet when viewed
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alone, ISAG shows opposite patterns than the AFWCF NOR for fiscal years 97-99. This
suggests that ISAG is counteracting the NOR and is thus bringing it closer to zero. This is
the desired impact of the Fund. Unlike SMAG, this activity group appears to be aiding
the AFWCF in attaining its goal of breaking even. Unfortunately, its impact is minute
due to the size of ISAG in comparison to the rest of the Fund.
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Figure 13. AFWCF NOR vs. ISAG NOR
Lastly, a comparison of the TWCF NOR against the AFWCF NOR shows another
interesting trend. The graph in Figure 14 illustrates the relationship between the two.
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Figure 14. AFWCF NOR vs. TWCF NOR
Notice that the TWCF NOR, like SMAG, closely mirrors the AFWCF NOR. This too
shows that the TWCF could be a significant driver of the consolidated NOR. Table 2
below shows the actual contribution of each of the activity groups to the overall AFWCF
NOR. It is evident that based on the size of the different activity group operations, some
contribute a great deal more than others.
Table 2. Individual NORs
$
Millions
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001

DMAG
(236.254)
(34.636)
178.461
(109.030)
(28.216)

SMAG
28.639
316.715
87.800
(95.211)
206.036

ISAG
4.092
(7.419)
(0.996)
(11.179)
(6.865)

TWCF
(18.200)
287.800
(51.200)
(183.200)
15.700

AFWCF
(221.723)
562.460
214.065
(398.620)
186.655

To confirm the contribution each of the activity groups makes to the overall
operating result in the NOR, a bivariate correlation was run to identify which activity
groups have had the greatest impact on the Fund. This descriptive measure also
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identified any correlation among the activity groups themselves. The results are
presented in Table 3.
Table 3. NOR Correlations and Significance Levels
DMAG
DMAG
SMAG
ISAG
TWCF
AFWCF

TWCF

1
0.286485
1
-0.1384 -0.06181
1
0.067861 0.922708 0.002225
1
0.543569 0.94694 -0.06374 0.864207
DMAG

DMAG
SMAG
ISAG
TWCF
AFWCF

Correlation
SMAG
ISAG

.
0.640
0.824
0.914
0.344

Significance
SMAG
ISAG
.
0.921
0.025
0.015

.
0.997
0.919

TWCF

.
0.059

AFWCF

1
AFWCF

.

Use of a bivariate correlation function allowed for comparison among all pairs.
Looking at the AFWCF correlation row, it appears that both the SMAG and TWCF are
highly correlated to the AFWCF NOR while DMAG is moderately correlated and ISAG
has a slight negative correlation. To verify these findings it was necessary to observe the
resulting p-values. A correlation is said to be significant if its corresponding p-value is
less than alpha. In this case, the significance levels were tested against an alpha of 0.05
and were instrumental in determining true statistical significance.
Based on the p-values presented above (Table 3), the only correlation that holds
true is the relationship between the AFWCF and SMAG. The p-value of 0.015 indicates
that there is a statistically significant correlation among these factors. However, the
relationship between AFWCF and TWCF is very near the significance level with a
returned p-value of 0.059. Ordinarily, this would be further scrutinized to determine if
significance really exists here but with so few data points (5) for comparison there is no
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need. A larger sample of NORs would yield different results and would more clearly
identify if there were significance.
Finally, one other to point out is the statistically significant correlation among the
SMAG and TWCF pair with a correlation coefficient of 0.923 and a p-value of 0.025.
The best explanation for this result is that SMAG expends the largest amount of any of
the activity groups on the transportation of people and things. These expenditures
directly relate to the revenue TWCF receives. However, with so few data points in the
model, a 0.846 correlation coefficient is not considered highly correlated nor is it
statistically significant.
Based on the information presented on the preceding pages, there is difficulty
ascertaining whether or not the pricing strategies of the AFWCF reflect the goals of the
DWCF. Although all of the activity groups strive to come as close to breaking even as
possible, their efforts are thwarted by the need to recoup the AOR and the regulatory
constraints that are in place. This being the case, it is necessary to look at the pricing
strategy of each of the activity groups individually to determine if they are being a
hindrance or help to the health of the DWCF. Unfortunately, due to the time constraints
of this research, only a small portion of the AFWCF was studied. The AFWCF is a
complicated process of give and take on the part of the customers and activity groups.
Fully understanding the price setting process often takes those directly involved with the
Fund years to comprehend. There is a delicate balance between all parties involved and
very often the actions of one affect many. This is most often the case in the DMAG and
SMAG relationship described earlier in the paper. Therefore, we suggest that further
research be conducted to look at each division of each activity group. We have chosen to
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focus our efforts on the pricing strategy of the Materiel Support Division of the SMAG.
This will be discussed later in this chapter.
In answering the second question of whether or not the activity groups have
differing pricing strategies, the answer is yes. As outlined in Chapter One, the price
setting technique used by each activity group is prescribed by the DODFMR 7000.14R,
Volume 2B, Chapter 9. This document states that there are two ways to setting rates,
based on whether the activity group is supply management-oriented or not. The SMAG
is a supply entity so its pricing strategy must incorporate the cost of its commodities
along with a surcharge to establish the rates it will charge customers. DMAG, ISAG and
TWCF, on the other hand, are all service-oriented divisions. Their rates are based on
their respective output measures, such as direct labor hour or direct per standard hour.
Although it is evident that only a couple of the Fund’s activity groups have a large
affect overall, specific areas of the budget estimates (revenues and expenses) will be
studied to identify any trend in the estimations. This information will provide valuable
insight into areas being consistently over or under estimated and those having a
significant impact on the Fund.
The Budget Estimate Submission is a compilation of the expected revenues and
expenses the Fund expects to generate in a given fiscal year. It includes a compilation of
the four activity groups’ data as well as each individual activity groups’ specific data.
There is a general format that the revenues and expenses are reported in that all
submissions have followed subsequent to FY97. The activity groups report their
operations in the categories shown in Figure 15.
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Figure 15. FY03 BES Sample
Each BES includes data in these categories in one of three fiscal years. It includes
the requested (expected) revenues and expenses for the fiscal year that is being budgeted,
the approved budget amounts for the fiscal year prior and the actual revenues and
expenditures for the fiscal year prior to that. For example, the FY 2003 BES included the
requested FY 2003 amounts (2003 R), the approved FY 2002 amounts (2002 AP), and
the actual FY 2001 amounts (2001 AC).
After obtaining the BES’ for fiscal years 1997 – 2004, analysis of the differences
between the requested and actuals, and the fluctuation in the requested and approved
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amounts was examined across each of the activity groups. This information was valuable
in determining accuracy of the estimates, and whether or not there are areas of the
AFWCF that are consistently estimated incorrectly; thus having a negative impact on the
Funds operating result and preventing it from achieving its goal of breaking even. It
should however be stated that the Fund can never break-even and it is an impossibility to
create an exact estimate. In fact, the statistical probability of achieving 100% accuracy is
zero.
Examination of Estimate Accuracy
According to many critics, one of the chief problems with the Fund is that it does
not reach its goal of breaking even. The next measure of the Fund’s performance was the
accuracy of the initial estimates against the actual revenues and expenses. First, a
Revenue Growth Factor (RGF) and an Expense Growth Factor (EGF) were computed for
each of the activity groups in fiscal years 1999 to 2002. These values show whether the
revenues or expenses were under or over estimated in a given year. A Growth Factor
value > 1 indicates that the initial estimate was less than the actual income or expenditure
while a Growth Factor value < 1 indicates the opposite. The impact to the activity group
depends on the whether it is an expense or a revenue. For instance, when a RGF is less
than 1, the initial revenue estimate was less than the actual revenues recorded. This
difference creates a loss in the activity group. On the other hand, when an EGF is less
than 1, the initial expense estimate was also less than the actual expenses recorded but
this creates a gain for the activity group.
Examining tables 4 and 5, it is evident that there are large fluctuations in the
estimates of the activity groups. The group best at estimating revenues is TWCF with an
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average RGF of 0.990, indicating that TWCF is generally within 1% of its initial
estimate. TWCF is also the most accurate when estimating expenses with an average
EGF of 0.967, signifying that TWCF’s initial expense estimations are within 3.3% of the
actual expenditures. While TWCF experiences the least fluctuation, ISAG has averaged
the worst fluctuations with an RGF and an EGF of 1.158 and 1.179 respectively.
However, these values are overstated due to the largely inaccurate estimates in FY99 due
primarily to the fact that this was one of the activity groups first years in existence and
experienced many growing pains. Their estimations since then have improved
considerably. Omitting the inflated data from FY99, the RGF and EGF are 1.053 and
1.066 respectively.
Table 4. Revenue Growth Factors

SMAG
DMAG
ISAG
TWCF

A RGF < 1 = initial < actual (Fund gains $)
A RGF > 1 = initial > actual (Fund loses $)
2002
2001
2000
1999
Average
0.955
0.904
1.010
0.935
0.951
1.081
1.115
1.107
1.113
1.104
1.047
1.030
1.083
1.470
1.158
1.001
0.931
0.957
1.072
0.990

Table 5. Expense Growth Factors

SMAG
DMAG
ISAG
TWCF

A EGF > 1 = initial < actual (Fund loses $)
A EGF < 1 = initial > actual (Fund gains $)
2002
2001
2000
1999
Average
0.954
0.881
0.995
0.913
0.936
1.127
1.088
1.153
1.121
1.122
1.051
1.044
1.102
1.518
1.179
0.884
0.933
0.963
0.963
0.967

Another detail to take note of is the consistent pattern in the activity groups:
DMAG and ISAG are consistently overestimating revenue and underestimating expenses;
SMAG primarily underestimates revenue and has always overestimated expenses.
Fortunately, these inaccurate estimates are counteracting each other. For example, in
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FY01, DMAG projected revenues to be $5.05 billion and expenses to be $5.07 billion.
Actual revenues ended up coming in at $5.63 billion; an increase in revenue of $0.58
billion. Actual expenses were reportedly higher than expected at $5.52 billion, an
increase in expenses of $0.45 billion. All but $0.13 billion of these errors are negated by
the other category. So, as long as one category is overestimated and the other
underestimated, the activity group can counter the effect of any extreme changes in that
particular year.
Before proceeding to the analysis of the individual revenue and expense
categories, a hypothesis test was constructed to determine if the revenues and expenses
were statistically equivalent. The following hypotheses were tested using a two-tailed
t test and a 95% confidence interval:
Ho: µ RGF = µ EGF
H1: µ RGF ≠ µ EGF
Table 6 shows the results as they appeared in Microsoft Excel. The null hypothesis will
be rejected if the test statistic falls outside of the confidence interval. The 95%
confidence interval is (-2.04,2.04); the test statistic is 0.83442. The test statistic falls
between the critical values of the confidence interval. Therefore, we fail to reject the null
hypothesis and assume the mean RGF and the mean EGF to be statistically equivalent.
The impact of the previous statement supports evidence that the AFWCF is
statistically meeting the break-even goal as far as revenues and expenses are concerned.
However, when the prior-year AOR is included in the budget estimate submission
problems arise and the activity groups move farther from the break-even goal. Removing
the requirement to recoup or reintroduce the prior-year AOR from the activity group’s
responsibility may lead to a better-balanced Fund.
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Table 6. Two-Tailed t Test for Growth Factor Equivalence
Mean
Variance
Observations
Pooled Variance
Hypothesized Mean Difference
df
t Stat
P(T<=t) two-tail
t Critical two-tail
Std Dev
CV

RGF
1.050688
0.01741
16
0.012943
0
30
0.83442
0.41064
2.04227
0.131948
0.125583

EGF
1.017125
0.008475
16

0.092061
0.090511

Analysis of Individual Categories
A brief analysis of the trends associated with individual revenue and expense
categories was conducted to locate areas necessitating more attention while building
estimates. Large variations were found among the activity groups so each group was
evaluated separately. In fact, some categories had estimates that were incorrect by as
much as 2000% while others had only a 0.01% inaccuracy rate. Yet in all fairness to the
estimators, there is no crystal ball that allows them to see what will happen two years
down the road. They are limited by the information at hand and are unaware of future
fluctuations. By identifying areas of consistent inaccuracy, the intent is to provide insight
to the AFWCF estimating personnel to aid in the elimination of the risk inherent in
estimation.
Prior to exhibiting areas needing closer scrutiny, there are a few limitations
needing identification. First, revenue categories were reviewed from FY99 to FY02
whereas expense categories were reviewed from FY00 to FY02. The reason behind this
difference is that in FY97, when the initial budget estimate was submitted for FY99, the
expense categories were broken out differently than they were in subsequent years. We
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were unable to accurately match FY 99 expenses to the categories used today. Second,
only categories were considered that had activity all years in review. And last, only
categories that are consistently overestimated or consistently underestimated will be
identified. Those categories that have an overestimation one year and an underestimation
the next were omitted from this investigation. The goal is to show recurrent trends that
can be altered and adjusted for by the estimators. The categories under consideration are
listed in the previous BES sample in Figure 15.
SMAG Estimations
After investigating the SMAG data, nine categories were found that were
constantly overestimated or underestimated. All trends were found in the expense
portion of the data; none were found in the revenue categories. Of those nine expense
categories, only two showed constant underestimation. Table 7 presents the SMAG
findings.
Table 7. SMAG Estimation Trends for Consistently Underestimated and
Overestimated Budget Categories for FY 00-FY02
Expense Category
Materials & Supplies (For Internal Purposes)
Transportation of Things

Finding
FY02
Underestimated 81.41
Underestimated 121.91

FY01
39.22
32.65

Civilian Personnel Compensation & Benefits
Travel & Transportation of Personnel
Printing & Reproduction
Advisory and Assistance Services
Rent, Communications, Utilities & Misc. Charges
Other Purchased Services
Other Expenses

Overestimated
2.78
11.63
Overestimated 40.97
29.58
Overestimated 33.14
12.68
Overestimated 100.00 100.00
Overestimated 99.96
90.88
Overestimated 99.65
98.99
Overestimated 99.96
100.38
All values are percentages

FY00
53.49
131.06
7.20
23.37
28.33
31.85
26.23
32.70
99.45

Additional research should be conducted to identify which divisions of SMAG are
the largest contributors to these trends. This detailed information was not available
during this research project.
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DMAG Estimations
Thorough analysis of the DMAG data resulted in finding seven categories
consistently under or over estimated. Unlike SMAG, two categories fall under the
revenue heading. Table 8 lists DMAG findings.
Table 8. DMAG Estimation Trends for Consistently Underestimated and
Overestimated Budget Categories for FY 99-FY02
Revenue Category
Operations
Other Income

Finding
FY02
Underestimated 4.16
Underestimated 127.73

FY01
6.29
266.24

FY00
5.15
44.60

FY99
8.45
221.70

Expense Category
Materials & Supplies (For
Internal Purposes)
Underestimated 25.24
5.16
13.91
Civilian Personnel Compensation
& Benefits
Underestimated 6.53
6.25
6.13
Rent, Communications, Utilities
& Misc. Charges
Underestimated 12.62
21.88
9.42
Other Purchased Services
Underestimated 9.80
17.16
25.14
Other Expenses
Overestimated 100.00 100.00 100.00
All values are percentages

Unlike SMAG, many of the DMAG categories are underestimated. The category
entitled “Other Income” had the largest delta. In all but fiscal year 2002, the activity
group was not expecting any additional income in this category. Yet, each year there was
income ranging from $266.242 million to $547.000 million. Further study to identify the
source of this income would aid in determining if this factor can be estimated more
accurately. The same sort of situation applies to the “Other Expenses” category. In this
case, expenses were expected but never materialized.
ISAG Estimations
Recall that ISAG is the smallest and newest activity group of the AFWCF so the
impact it has on the Fund is minor compared to the rest of the activity groups, as
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evidenced by the low correlation coefficient previously presented in Table 3. Yet, any
adverse impact on the Fund needs to be studied and corrected if possible.
Analysis of ISAG revenues and expenses identified only four categories with
consistencies; one of which falls under revenue. And with the exception of one category,
all are underestimations. ISAG estimation trends can be found in Table 9. Note that the
problem area is the estimation of equipment expenses but there is decreasing trend in the
inaccuracy of this element.
Table 9. ISAG Estimation Trends for Consistently Underestimated and
Overestimated Budget Categories for FY 99-FY02
Revenue Category
Operations

Finding
FY02
Underestimated 4.73

FY01
2.99

FY00
8.31

FY99
48.98

Expense Category
Materials & Supplies (For
Internal Purposes)
Overestimated 33.82 34.31
120.73
Civilian Personnel Compensation
& Benefits
Underestimated 17.95
2.26
3.11
Equipment
Underestimated 87.56 524.36 2023.82
All values are percentages

TWCF Estimations
Last, a look at TWCF trends completes this portion of the BES analysis. Six
expense categories were identified as having consistent estimation patterns, all located in
the expense category. They are shown in Table 10. Notice that the steadiest pattern is in
the “Equipment” category. Based on the present data, this is a prime example of where a
cost growth factor could be built into the estimate to eliminate the continual
overestimation in years to come.
Estimation Summary
Reviewing the findings presented above, it is evident that two expense categories
have been continuous problems for the estimators: Civilian Personnel Compensation &
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Benefits and Material Purchases (For Internal Purposes). Each of the four activity
groups had difficulties accurately predicting these elements for the three years under
review. Table 11 illustrates the commonality among the activity groups.
Table 10. TWCF Estimation Trends for Consistently Underestimated and
Overestimated Budget Categories for FY 00-FY02
Expense Category
Finding
FY02
Civilian Personnel Compensation & Benefits
Overestimated 63.67
Equipment
Overestimated 59.80
Materials & Supplies (For Internal Purposes)
Overestimated
8.05
Other Purchases from Revolving Funds
Overestimated 41.00
Rent, Communications, Utilities & Misc. Charges Overestimated 56.39
Transportation of Things
Overestimated 40.91
Travel & Transportation of Personnel
Underestimated 127.82

FY01
3.52
58.01
14.64
11.60
31.05
13.13
0.36

FY00
0.08
48.24
10.12
13.30
9.61
0.64
0.72

All values are percentages

Table 11. Common Expense Categories Consistently Underestimated or
Overestimated by AFWCF Activity Groups
Category
Civilian
Personnel
Compensation &
Benefits
Materials &
Supplies
(For Internal
Purposes)

Activity Group
SMAG
DMAG
ISAG
TWCF
SMAG
DMAG
ISAG
TWCF

Average %
Deviation
Finding
Overestimated
7.2
Underestimated
6.3
Underestimated
7.77
Overestimated
22.42
Underestimated
58.04
Underestimated
14.77
Overestimated
62.95
Overestimated
10.94

These findings should be addressed to AFWCF senior leadership and more
information should be gathered from the respective activity groups to determine if this is
simply coincidence or if this is a problem that can be avoided with better identification of
the risks associated with over or under estimating these categories. Again, with such a
trend, a growth factor could be developed that can be incorporated into the estimation
process that will effectively account for this discrepancy.
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Lack of Inflation
One problem identified when reviewing information in the BES’ obtained for this
study was the omission of inflation when incorporating the AOR from a prior-year. The
problem lies in the fact that when the prior-year AOR is added to the budget estimate, it
is not reduced to account for inflation. This is the case throughout all of the activity
groups in all of the BES reviewed. Because this was so common, the base year for each
BES was verified to determine that this was in fact an omission. Personnel from HQ
AFMC/LG verified what appeared to be true-- values in the FY01 column are in FY01
dollars, values in the FY02 column are in FY02 dollars and values in the FY03 column
are in FY03 dollars. A sample transcribed from the Fund 14 report for DMAG in the
FY03 BES is shown in Table 12 for explanation purposes.
Table 12. Actual Uninflated AOR Data from DMAG Portion of FY03 BES
2001
2002
2003
Actual
Approved Requested
(175.904) (253.151)
(43.283)
(253.151) (43.283)
(43.283)

($ in Millions)
Prior-Year AOR
Accumulated Operating Result

One would expect the prior-year AOR in FY02 that is being recouped from FY01 to be
larger due to inflation and the same for FY03. The problem is that when the inflation
factor is not accounted for, the prior-year AOR is underestimated. Using raw OSD
inflation indices for O&M monies, with a base year of FY01 the values in Table 12 were
inflated for FY02 and FY03 at 1.017 and 1.030 respectively to reflect the true amounts
needing to be incorporated in the BES. These are shown in Table 13 below. Notice that
there is now a large difference in the Prior-Year AORs being recouped. Approximately
$4.3 million more needs to be recouped in FY02 and $1.3 million more in FY03. Keep in
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mind that this is just the DMAG portion of the AFWCF, the other activity groups will
need to be inflated as well which will produce an even greater effect. By correcting this
easily remedied error, the Fund’s estimates will be more accurate which will aid in
approaching the break-even point.
Table 13. Proposed Inflation of AOR Data from DMAG Portion of FY03 BES
2001
2002
2003
Actual
Approved Requested
(175.904) (257.455)
(44.581)
(253.151)
(43.283)
(43.283)

($ in Millions)
Prior-Year AOR
Accumulated Operating Result

MSD Review
Remember that the MSD is responsible for providing parts, frequently referred to
as Depot Level Reparables (DLRs), to its customers for use in weapons systems. Most
often MSD obtains these DLRs from the Depot Maintenance Activity Group (DMAG),
but also purchases them from commercial vendors. The MSD is an integral part of the
warfighter’s capability. Without the necessary spares for repair, the mission may not be
accomplished. This importance is also demonstrated in the fact that this is the largest
division of the SMAG and in FY02 was projected to generate $9 billion of the activity
group’s $20 billion in expected revenue. The focus on MSD is therefore necessary to
understand why the SMAG is the key driver in the AFWCF’s performance as mentioned
earlier in this chapter.
MSD Pricing Strategy
The Materiel Support Division’s (MSD) pricing strategy has undergone recent
changes that are expected to positively affect its customers. Before describing the new
strategy, it is important to understand what type of pricing process it is moving from.
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After the strategy is explained, we will determine if it follows commercial best practices
as outlined by Olsen and Peter.
Up until fiscal year 2003, the MSD pricing strategy revolved around recouping
the prior year losses it had generated so a surcharge was added to all DLR orders. And
like most of the other activity groups, it wasn’t able to accurately price its products so
customers were continually canceling orders because prices were raised higher than their
budgets would allow. It was a form of cost-plus pricing. Ordinarily, cost-plus pricing
encompasses all direct and indirect costs associated with a product and adds an additional
percentage for profit. The MSD tries to capture all direct costs but has done a poor job of
capturing the true indirect costs of a product. As such, you will see that MSD charges a
surcharge that is essentially summarizing its best guess at indirect costs. However, there
is an added portion that is necessary to recoup prior year losses. This is in essence the
same as trying to make a profit. This is the best description of MSD’s pricing method in
the early days. The pricing approach up until FY03 had been in place for several years.
A multi-part pricing scheme is slated to begin in FY05, which alleviates much of the
burden to recoup the NOR from the customers, and shifts it to HQ AFMC.
Like all other AFWCF divisions, MSD begins the pricing process two years prior
to the year of execution. So, in FY99, the FY01 budget estimate along with the price
build commenced. The first step was to obtain customer requirements. These
requirements are estimated by the customer and are output in the form of the D200
Report. This automated report utilizes computer algorithms to evaluate prior year
requirements and projected requirements to arrive at the future requirements that are
ultimately used to build the prices. The algorithms within this program have not been
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studied but warrant a closer look to determine the accuracy of their output. Accurate
requirements are vital to the accuracy of the rates emerging from the budget process
since, in its simplest form, the rate is a function of the costs and requirements.
While estimated requirements are being built, MSD personnel are gathering data
to determine what revenues and expenses the division expects to encounter. The
revenues and expenses are what you will find in the BES. However, this portion of the
research is concerned with the price development procedure. Prior to FY03, there were
three areas to consider during the rate (price) build. The first component of the price is
the weighted average repair cost which is also known as the Latest Repair Cost (LRC).
This is the cost to repair a DLR. It is comprised of both organic repairs and repairs made
by contractors. These factors are then weighted to obtain the total LRC. This amount is
then divided by the estimated requirements from the D200 to obtain the cost to repair
each DLR. Note that this price will fluctuate based on the type of DLR being priced.
The next component of the price charged the customers is called the Total Buy
Surcharge Base on Projected Orders. This element is a surcharge added to the LRC and
is determined by the requirements system. It is based on total orders so it includes orders
for condemnations as well as orders for routine repairs, making no distinction on when
the order will be delivered. Often times, an order will be submitted for a condemnation
but the part will not be delivered to the customer for a few years later. This was the most
volatile portion of the price because the surcharge was often very different for customers.
It is based on the expected buys, as outlined in the requirements, for individual DLR
items. There were large fluctuations in the surcharge being charged different customers.
While one customer may have a small surcharge, another may encounter one that is
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enormous. This was due to the fact that the surcharge was based on a market basket of
goods; this does not encompass all items in the inventory. So parts were simply put into
a category that best fit its description and that surcharge prevailed. Many customers felt
there was no real rhyme or reason on how this surcharge was set. It just didn’t add up.
And as you will see later, this is the portion of the price process that sees the most change
in future years.
The last element in the price is a surcharge that’s added to all DLRs to cover
business operation expenses, also known as overhead. This portion of the price was
more predictable than the latter but it still fluctuated because the Supply Chain Managers
(SCM) were able to set the surcharge based on the parts they control at their location. As
one can probably ascertain, this type of pricing strategy did not lend itself to helping the
AFWCF achieve its break-even goal. Let’s see how the process changes in the coming
years.
The FY03-04 pricing strategy is similar to the previous process with the exception
of the surcharges. Now, instead of having two surcharges based on the commodity or
SCM, there is one flat surcharge that encompasses both of these elements which is
computed at the HQAFMC level. Another change is that rather than the surcharge taking
into account parts for repairs and condemnations, it will only be based on projected
delivery of parts. Customers will no longer be paying for condemnation items they have
not yet taken delivery of. This increases rate stability for customers as well as decreases
losses for the Fund. But, according to HQAFMC personnel this is expected to meet only
90% of the DLR pricing objectives. The other 10% is an expected loss in this fiscal year.
This is clearly not promoting a break-even mentality. Yet, this situation is only
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temporary. In FY05, another change is projected to occur and should remedy this
problem.
The final projected change to the MSD pricing strategy will occur in FY05. Again
this method is similar to the previous years’ process, with the exception of further
changing the surcharge portion of the price. This final change is definitely a step in the
right direction. Beginning this fiscal year, Air Force customers will only be charged the
LRC when a sale is made. The remaining overhead expenses will be billed directly to a
corporate Air Force account that will not affect the operation of the division. All non-Air
Force customers will be required to pay the surcharge. The initial set-up of this corporate
account will be the result of funds being realigned from the Air Force and the Office of
the Secretary of Defense. In subsequent years, it will be the sole responsibility of
HQAFMC to fund this account. The bad news is that HQAFMC needs to realign funds
to do this. The goods news is that customers will see costs that are more comparable to
items they can purchase on the outside so they will be less apt to cancel orders. This
results in more stabilized revenue for the SMAG and ultimately the AFWCF, which will
aid the Fund in reaching its primary goal.
MSD vs. Commercial Pricing Practices
Looking back in the Literature Review you will find a six-step pricing strategy
proposed by Olsen and Peter. Their approach, though focused on the private sector, was
especially of interest to this study due to its foundation of consumer analysis. An in depth
look at their process was also included in chapter 2. What follows is a comparison of the
MSD pricing strategy to Olsen and Peter’s strategy to determine if MSD is operating
inline with commercial best practices. The six steps are as follows:
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1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Analyze consumer product relationship
Analyze the environmental situation
Determine the role of price in marketing strategy
Estimate relevant production and marketing costs
Set pricing objectives
Develop pricing strategy and set prices

Step 1 – Analyze Consumer Product Relationship
This step is essential for MSD since it relies on its customer’s projections of
requirements to set its prices. This research found that MSD does a fair job of obtaining
the information needed. However, one disturbing fact discovered early on was that MSD
was not tracking the accuracy of the requirements submitted by the customer. Yet, as of
December 2002, MSD was working on remedying this oversight. If you refer back to
Table 1 you can see the impact to the customer if they over-estimate their requirements.
On the other hand, it has a serious affect on the fund because it will not sell as many parts
due to the over-inflated requirements, which drives a loss in the Fund because expenses
do not change in proportion to revenue. MSD is aware of the implication of accurate
requirements estimates and is taking appropriate action to track their exactness.
Step 2 – Analyze Environmental Situation
The environment MSD operates within is notably unique and typically more
constrained than what is found in the commercial sector. Revisiting information stated in
chapter 2, the main purpose of performing this phase in strategic pricing is to obtain
information about competitors in the market and determine the value the customer places
on the product. MSD, like any other military organization, operates within a distinctive
environment focused ultimately on national defense. As such, MSD must focus on
meeting the needs of the warfighter above all else. An examination of each of these
factors and their pertinence to MSD was completed.
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The unique operating environment of MSD encompasses a wide array of
situations. First and foremost is the realization that MSD functions like a monopoly due
to the unique nature of the parts it supplies to customers. MSD manages over 132,000
inventory items for aircraft, missiles, engines and DLRs that in most cases cannot be
obtained from the private sector due to contractual agreements or one-of-a kind
requirements. There is no outside source for these parts so it can be said that MSD has an
internal market. Equally, MSD must analyze its internal market to assess its readiness to
respond to not only current requirements but also future requirements brought about by
contingency operations or future threats the military will respond to.
Another difference in the MSD environment when compared to the commercial
sector is the imposition of strict constraints. All large businesses encounter some degree
of adversity when altering their business operations but in most cases, an act of Congress
is not required to change these instructions. The strict oversight by Congress of the DoD,
the stringent regulatory requirements MSD must follow and looming budgetary
limitations are all constraining factors that must be addressed and dealt with accordingly.
Unlike a commercial firm, MSD can carry a negative operating result for an extended
period of time without the formidable fact that it will either go out of business or go
bankrupt because other divisions in the AFWCF can counter the negative effect on the
Fund.
When considering value from the customer’s point-of-view, many factors are
present in the commercial environment including not only the monetary value of the
product but the importance or value customers place on intangible costs and benefits.
Unfortunately, the perceived value of the warfighter is often a moot point. They must

64

purchase items whether they value them or not to continue to support the mission. And
again, due to the limited source of many products MSD carries, customers are forced to
make purchases regardless of how they perceive the product’s value to their program.
To summarize, MSD’s environmental situation is influenced by many
constraining elements and has few, if any, competitors. The main constraints are those
imposed by the Congress and DoD regulations along with the limited budgets its
customers are working with. The perceived value of MSD’s customers is not a
consideration due to the uniqueness of the parts it supplies. However, it may warrant
further research in other areas of the AFWCF. For instance, the GSD supplies many
items that can be purchased in the private sector. And often the prices in the private
sector are considerably lower than what the GSD division is charging due to the over
inflation of price caused by the surcharges. Though this step of the price setting process
is entirely appropriate for the commercial sector, it is only partially so for the MSD.
Step 3 – Determine the Role of Price in Marketing Strategy
To begin with, the marketing strategy of MSD is not to make a profit or gain hold
of a new market segment as in a commercial firm. When considering marketing strategy
in the MSD, the focus remains on accurately pricing products so customers will purchase
as close to the number stated in their initial estimates as possible. Remember that the
customer plays a large role in the price of the product due to the formula used to compute
the price. The LRC for an item is divided by the total requirements submitted by all
customers for that item resulting in the price charged each customer for that item.
Surcharges are then added to cover other operating expenses. Understanding this
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relationship is the key to understanding the role of price in the marketing strategy of
MSD.
Another element of understanding price in the marketing strategy is the
realization that there is little, if any external market for MSD to conquer. Instead, MSD
operates in an internal market, supplying primarily Air Force customers with its products.
One noted exception is the foreign military sales of products to other allied governments.
Yet the percentage of these sales in relation to the sales to the Air Force and other DoD
services is minute. The role of pricing in MSD is highly related to the performance of
the SMAG. And based on the high correlation between the AFWCF and SMAG, MSD is
strongly related to how the AFWCF performs as well. Yet, the importance of price to
MSD customers cannot be understated. This is the single most important step MSD must
focus on, not only for the benefit of this division, but also for the benefit of the AFWCF
and ultimately the DWCF. Inaccurate pricing can push the performance of the AFWCF
away from attaining its break-even goal. In fact, the role of price in the MSD
performance is simply charging customers inter-fund transfer prices. Due to the large
internal market and the absence of an external market, MSD sells a large portion of its
products to Air Force customers. Understanding how internal customers are affected by
changes is vital to the division’s success.
The role of price in the MSD is simple, if prices are too high, customers cannot
buy as many products as they had estimated. Without this revenue, the division will
suffer a loss due to the expenses not dropping in proportion to the decreased income. The
accurate estimation of requirements is a vital part of the revolving fund process and must
be watched carefully to ensure the division’s successful financial operation.
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Step 4 – Estimate Relevant Production and Marketing Costs
Requirements estimation is vital to this phase as well. Estimating the relevant
production and marketing costs is difficult for the MSD to do accurately due to the length
of the budget process. The MSD has the most trouble enacting this phase of Olsen and
Peter’s process. This phase is very important to the success of the Division but this is
also where the budgetary process imposed by the DoD is questioned. Not only is MSD
required to accept the requirements from their customers two years in advance of the
budget execution, they must also determine what costs will be two years in advance.
Ideally, a firm should be able to accurately estimate its costs prior to setting its prices yet
the commercial sector does not impose this lengthy budget process.
This phase of the process is also where it is identified how prices should be set.
In the commercial world, this enables the identification of the minimum price needed to
enter the market. For MSD, this is comparable to determining what the prices will have
to be to meet its goal of breaking-even. Although the MSD meet the requirements of this
step, it is again hindered by the regulatory constraints imposed upon it.
Step 5 – Set Pricing Objectives
Setting the pricing objectives a firm wants to achieve can be a daunting task. For
many, this can include identification of the company’s goal and objectives. The
objectives are set here to meet those goals. The private firms will generally aim to make
a minimum return on investment or minimum profit it will accept. Unfortunately, MSD
does not have the luxury of setting its own objectives. Instead, it must seek to achieve
the goals of its parent organization, the DWCF. So, rather than striving to meet a certain
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return on investment, its main objective is to set its prices so it can come as close to
breaking even as possible.
Step 6 – Develop Pricing Strategy and Set Prices
The final step in Olsen and Peter’s (1996) process is the culmination of the work
performed under the five previous steps. All aspects of the organization and its goals
come together here. The commercial side will mainly focus on setting prices that are far
enough about its costs to produce the revenue required to sustain its operations and meets
its goals. Furthermore, it strives to set its prices strategically so the required level of
demand is maintained.
MSD follows this step similarly to a private firm. It too wants to set its prices to
generate a predetermined amount of revenue. And, MSD focuses on the customer
demand by accepting requirements from its customers because if it doesn’t, it will not
meet its pricing objectives outlined in step 5. The only drawback for MSD is yet again,
the lengthy budget process that is drawn out beyond anything the commercial sector
could easily accommodate.
All in all, MSD is aligned with the commercial best practices outlined here with a
few notable exceptions. First, MSD works in a unique environment with little outside
competition. This limits the need for MSD to seek information about competitors.
Instead, the relationship with its customers necessitates the most attention. Second, the
lengthy budgetary process limits MSD’s ability to adapt to changing requirements in a
timely manner. Finally, regulatory guidance imposes strict rules on changes that can be
made during the budget process. This limits the flexibility MSD had to adapt to changing
environments, changing requirements and changing costs it encounters.
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V. Conclusion
Results
This study visited several aspects of the AFWCF’s operation and performance thus
enabling the study’s research objectives to be answered. Referring back to the three
research questions we sought to answer, it is apparent that answers to some are more
complex than others and have a greater impact on the Fund. Recall that the three
research objectives outlined in Chapter I are:
1. Are the goals of the DWCF reflected in the AFWCF Activity Group’s
pricing strategies?
2. How do the different Activity Groups under the AFWCF differ in their
pricing strategies? Is any Activity Group’s pricing strategy allowing them
to break-even?
3. How can the current pricing strategies be improved upon to come nearer to
meeting the DWCF’s goals? Where should the Air Force focus its efforts to
improve the MSD pricing strategy?
The remainder of this paper will present answers to these questions, identify
limitations in the research process, make recommendations based upon the research
findings, and suggest additional areas of the AFWCF and related topics that warrant
future research.
AFWCF Goals
The answer to the first research question was identified throughout the literature
review phase of this study. It was determined that the goals of the DWCF are reflected in
the pricing strategies of the AFWCF. First, the AFWCF is a subsidiary division of the
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DWCF. As such, it inherits the DWCF’s goals and objectives. Additionally, the pricing
strategies for all of the DWCF divisions are outlined in the DODFMR 7000.14R and
must be followed with few exceptions. If a division is commodity based, it must price
its products based upon the cost of the commodity and add an additional surcharge to
cover the cost of operations. Non-supply based divisions price their services based upon
their output measures whether it be direct labor hour, direct per standard hour or some
other output measure. Due to this regulatory requirement, there is little room for
fluctuation. Though the AFWCF can have additional goals and objectives of its own, it
must follow and align itself with those of its parent organization. All things considered,
the AFWCF is inline with the DWCF’s goals.
Pricing Strategies & Performance
Closely related to the first research question, the first part of question number two
seeks to determine if the AFWCF activity groups have different pricing strategies. The
answer to this question was again found throughout the literature review. As mentioned
above, the divisions have different pricing strategies based upon the type of goods or
services they provide as outlined in the DoDFMR 7000.14R.
To answer the second portion of this question, whether or not any of the activity
group’s pricing strategies allowing them to break-even, it was necessary to analyze past
performance data. Remember that the general consensus is that the AFWCF is operating
poorly due to its inability to meet is primary objective of breaking-even over time. First,
the performance of the AFWCF based on the NOR and AOR, was plotted for fiscal years
1997 to 2001. This showed wide fluctuations in the both the AOR and NOR from yearto-year. However, since the AOR is the cumulative NOR since the Fund’s inception, I
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chose to focus on the performance at the NOR level as an indicator of the Fund’s
performance. The plot showed that although there are large fluctuations, the variance in
the annual NOR is decreasing as the Fund matures. This is evidence that the Fund is
becoming increasingly closer to meeting its goal of breaking-even which suggests that
AFWCF personnel are building better estimates.
Next, the performance of each of the activity group’s, based upon the NOR, was
compared to the NOR of the AFWCF to determine if any of the activity groups were key
drivers in the AFWCF’s performance. Initially, the graphs illustrated a possible
relationship between the AFWCF and SMAG, as well as the AFWCF and TWCF due to
the closely related trends among the NORs. Further analysis would need to be
conducted to determine if these are significant relationships. An additional relationship
between the AFWCF and ISAG was identified. This relationship illustrated that although
the ISAG is the smallest portion of the AFWCF, it appears to be having an opposite
effect on the Fund. It is minutely counteracting the effects of the other activity groups,
thus bringing the Fund closer to its break-even point.
Further analysis was conducted using bi-variate correlation. This identified that
the AFWCF/SMAG relationship was the only relationship having statistical significance.
Thus, SMAG is the key driver of the Fund’s performance. This is intuitive due to the fact
that SMAG is the largest activity group of the AFWCF. Nevertheless, it was important to
support this notion with statistical evidence. By identifying which activity group is
playing the largest role in the Fund’s success or failure allows AFWCF personnel to more
closely scrutinize the actions of the division in an attempt to improve the Fund’s
performance.
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The final portion of the performance analysis required the use of Fund 14 data in
Budget Estimate Submissions from fiscal years 1997 to 2004. Here, revenue and expense
categories were examined. The goal was to determine if the initial submissions in the
BES were equivalent to the actual income and expenditures for fiscal years 1999 to 2002.
Revenue and Expense growth factors were computed for each of the activity groups.
These factors demonstrated how accurate the initial estimates were when compared with
the actuals. The results suggest that TWCF has been submitting the most accurate BES.
However, it was also determined that DMAG and ISAG were consistently
underestimating revenue while SMAG and TWCF consistently overestimated expenses in
the BES’. These trends of over and under estimation deserve further study but were not
addressed in this research effort.
Further analysis was conducted to determine if overall revenues are equal to the
expenses. A hypothesis test was conducted to determine if the mean of the revenue
growth factors was equal to the mean of the expense growth factors. A two-tailed t test
as conducted to test for the equal means. This test resulted in a failure to reject the null
hypothesis, thus, we assume that the means are equal. The impact of this previous
statement supports evidence that the AFWCF is statistically meeting its break-even goal.
In other words, the estimates of revenues and expenses are accurate. However, it is
important to remember that this does not take into account the AOR that is recouped from
previous years. Yet, it does suggest that the problem does not lie in the estimation of
income and expenditures. Rather, it suggests that removing the requirement to recoup or
reintroduce the prior year’s AOR from the activity group’s responsibility may lead to a
better balanced Fund.
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Finally, the scope was narrowed yet again to look at the individual revenue and
expense categories for signs of consistent over or under estimation. Each of the activity
group’s had several areas that were consistent problems. However, there were two
categories in particular that were common among all activity groups: Civilian Personnel
Compensation & Benefits and Materials & Supplies (For Internal Purposes). Civilian
Personnel Compensation & Benefits was consistently overestimated by SMAG and
TWCF and underestimated by DMAG and ISAG. The Material & Supplies category was
consistently underestimated by SMAG and DMAG, while it was always overestimated by
ISAG and TWCF. More information should be gathered from the respective activity
groups to determine if this is simply coincidence or if this is a problem that can be
avoided with better identification of the risks associated with over and under estimating
these categories. If this is truly a problem area for the activity groups, a growth factor
could be developed that can be incorporated into the estimation process that will
effectively account for this common discrepancy.
Aside from the information presented above, one last item of interest was
identified when reviewing the figures presented in the BES. It appears that inflation was
not taken into account when the prior-year AOR was rolled back into the Fund. The
impact this has on the Fund is a negative one. By not incorporating inflation into the
estimates, the Fund is not striving to recoup the full amount of the AOR. When the
DMAG portion of the FY 2003 BES was observed and then properly inflated, it resulted
in $4.3 million more that needed to be recouped in FY02 and $1.3 million more in FY03.
Keep in mind that this is solely the DMAG portion of the AFWCF, the other activity
groups will need to be inflated as well, which will produce an even greater effect. By
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correcting this easily remedied error, the Fund’s estimates will be more accurate which
will aid in approaching the break-even point.
The analysis of the performance suggests that the AFWCF is not operating as
poorly as is often thought. In fact, most signs point to an improving Fund. First, the
NOR is decreasing over time. Next, SMAG is the key driver of the Fund’s performance
and should be treated as such, but it too has a decreasing NOR trend. And finally, the
estimated revenues are equivalent to the estimated expenses. The identification of
expense categories that are consistent problems among the activity groups will allow
AFWCF personnel to focus their efforts on these areas in particular, which will aid in
meeting the goals primary objective. Although the Fund is not breaking-even, this
analysis suggests that the AFWCF is as close to operating as intended as it will ever be,
as long as the AOR is still a factor.
MSD Pricing Strategy
The final research question was addressed by comparing the pricing strategy of
the Materiel Support Division against commercial best practices as outlined by Olsen and
Peter (1996). An analysis of their six-step pricing scheme implies that MSD is inline
with commercial best practices with a few minor exceptions. First, MSD operates within
the internal DOD market, which insists on a close working relationship with the
customer. Remember, customers tell MSD what the demand will be from year-to-year.
Second, due to the unique parts MSD provides its customers, competition is not a factor.
Third, price has a greater impact on MSD’s customers than customers in the commercial
sector. MSD’s customers have budget constraints imposed by the Congress that rarely
increase but often decrease. Any change in the price MSD charges will most certainly
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have a negative impact on the customer as well as the Fund. Finally, regulatory
requirements imposed on MSD prevent any flexibility in its pricing schema.
Limitations
There were a number of limiting factors throughout this research. Firstly, the
time it takes to fully understand the AFWCF concept is monumental. This is an enormous
process with many aspects. The research focused on the accrual accounting side of the
AFWCF since it is the most widely published and analyzed. However, a look at the
AFWCF’s performance from the cash accounting aspect may yield different results.
Second, gathering information to study this topic was both time consuming and difficult.
Information is available in several different accounting and logistical systems but most
background information was gathered from people and other AFWCF reports and
articles. Yet, the form used by each is different so apples to apples comparison could not
be made. Ultimately, the BES were the best source of data that could be obtained in a
timely fashion. However, the assumption that the information is correct was made. This
assumption was discovered to be false when looking at data for FY99. There were
several instances where itemized category totals did not match the category total. We
were unable to identify whether this was a simple addition error or if information was
missing so this data was omitted from the study.
Finally, much of the data prior to fiscal year 1999 was incomplete or reported in
different revenue and expense categories. Again, data prior to FY1999 was omitted from
this study.
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Recommendations
There are three recommendations that have stemmed from this research. The first
recommendation is to revisit the break-even goal that looms over the AFWCF. Not only
is this statistically impossible, it is unrealistic when looking at a $20 billion program.
Instead, a more realistic goal should be implemented that is both achievable and realistic.
A more suitable goal would be to set a target AOR ceiling or floor. However, since the
Fund receives the most attention when it carries a negative AOR, a ceiling would be most
appropriate. The value of this ceiling should be a percentage of the each division’s
revenue. If the division is expected to generate $9 billion in revenue, an AOR of $100
million is a mere 1.1% loss, just a drop in the bucket from this perspective. In fact, a cost
growth of only 1% would be welcomed in any program. The value the ceiling is set at is
cause for additional study to determine the most realistic and achievable value.
As a result of the research conducted here, cost growth factors should be built and
incorporated into the BES process for at least the two expense categories that proved to
be consistent problems for all activity groups. However, additional factors should be
built for each of the unique categories consistently over or underestimated by AFWCF
personnel in the activity groups. The inclusion of growth factors in the forecasting
process will provide a better estimation of revenues and expenses, thereby aiding the
Fund in more closely achieving its goal.
The final recommendation concerns the lack of inflation identified in the BES.
The lack of inflation when reincorporating the prior-year AOR drives a loss in the Fund.
These amounts must be inflated to their respective year to accurately estimate the Fund’s
future performance. This is easily remedied and will not require additional work. The
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inflation rates are already published when the BES is submitted. The time and effort
required to accurately inflate the prior-year AOR is negligible. Although the impact this
will have on the overall Fund may be minute, any estimate that is more accurate is
appreciated.
Future Research
The final area of this study includes several recommendations for future research
projects ranging from requirements estimation to other DWCF organizations. What
follows is a brief description of each of the recommended research areas.
D200 Study. As presented earlier in this paper, requirements are a key player in
the accuracy of AFWCF estimates. Thus, it is appropriate to recommend that a study be
conducted to review the accuracy of past requirements as submitted by the customer.
Additionally, the relevance and accuracy of the algorithms used in the D200 report
generation also warrant study.
Forecasting. Another area recommended for study is the forecasting techniques
utilized in the BES build process. Analysis of the current techniques may identify areas
needing improvement. We already know that the forecasts should contain a growth
factor for commonly misestimated elements to increase their accuracy. However, there
are other elements of estimations that can be reviewed and adjusted to ensure more
accurate forecasts.
Other DWCF Divisions. Other divisions of the DWCF should be studied to
determine if they are having similar problems to those of the AFWCF. The insight this
study can provide would be invaluable to the AFWCF. Information sharing is necessary
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and expected since each of the other DWCF divisions are confined by the same
regulatory and budgetary constraints.
Other AFWCF Activity Groups. Next, we recommend that other areas of the
AFWCF be studied to ascertain where their processes can be improved upon. It has
already been determined in Cintron’s (2002) thesis and this research effort that flexibility
in pricing and estimating is lost due to long lead times necessary in the PPBS cycle, as
well as constraints imposed by regulations. Additionally, it would be interesting to
determine if customers have as large an impact on service organizations as they do in the
MSD of SMAG.
DMAG / MSD Relationship. The relationship between DMAG and MSD is
recursive in nature. According to information obtained throughout this research effort,
DMAG cannot set its rates for depot level maintenance until it knows the prices that
MSD will charge it for parts. However, MSD cannot set their prices until they know
what rate DMAG will be charging to repair the parts it sends to the depots. As one might
suspect, there is an ongoing battle to accurately set these rates in a timely fashion.
However, the recursive nature requires DMAG to set its rates, pass them to MSD, MSD
will review and adjust their rates, and then send them back to the DMAG, and so on.
This continues until both have agreed on their rates. This is a circle that must be broken.
It is recommended that this relationship be studied to determine if there is a better way of
doing business between the two divisions. The new DMAG/MSD reconciliation is a step
in the right direction. Future research can determine if this will work long term and can
perhaps identify if it is more appropriate for MSD to fall under DMAG’s control.
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